Petitioners Douglas Humberto Urias-Orellana, his wife, and their minor child, all natives of El Salvador, entered the United States without authorization in 2021. They sought asylum, claiming that a hitman had been targeting Urias-Orellana since 2016, resulting in threats against his family and physical assault. An Immigration Judge credited the petitioners' testimony regarding the threats but denied asylum, finding the evidence insufficient to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, and the First Circuit upheld the removal order, applying the substantial-evidence standard of review. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split regarding whether courts should apply de novo review or the substantial-evidence standard to the agency's determination that facts do not constitute persecution.
Justice Jackson delivered a unanimous opinion holding that the Immigration and Nationality Act requires the application of the substantial-evidence standard to the agency's determination of whether a given set of undisputed facts rises to the level of persecution. The Court relied on 8 U.S.C. §1252(b)(4)(B), which states that administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary. The Court interpreted this provision as codifying the deferential standard established in INS v. Elias-Zacarias, which requires an asylum applicant to show that the evidence presented was 'so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.' The Court rejected petitioners' argument that de novo review should apply to the 'mixed question of law and fact' inherent in the persecution determination. The Court clarified that while Elias-Zacarias and subsequent cases like Wilkinson v. Garland and Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr addressed whether certain issues qualify as 'questions of law' exempt from jurisdiction-stripping provisions, those decisions do not dictate the standard of review under §1252(b)(4)(B). The Court concluded that Congress intended for the entirety of the persecution determination, including the application of the statutory standard to the facts, to receive substantial-evidence deference.
The decision affirms the First Circuit's judgment, upholding the removal order against the petitioners. Practically, this ruling resolves the circuit split by mandating that all courts of appeals apply the substantial-evidence standard when reviewing the Board of Immigration Appeals' determinations on persecution. It reinforces the high bar for asylum seekers to overturn agency findings, requiring them to demonstrate that the evidence is so compelling that no reasonable adjudicator could reach a different conclusion. The ruling clarifies that the deferential standard applies to the entire persecution determination, not just the underlying factual findings, limiting the scope for judicial intervention in agency asylum decisions.