Isabel Rico was sentenced to federal prison followed by four years of supervised release. After violating conditions, she was sent back to prison for two months and ordered to serve a new 42-month term of supervised release set to expire in June 2021. Shortly after her release in December 2017, Rico changed her residence without notifying her probation officer, triggering a warrant for her arrest. She remained at large until January 2023. During her abscondment, she committed a state drug offense in January 2022, after her federal supervised release term had technically expired in June 2021. The district court treated this post-expiration drug offense as a Grade A violation of her supervised release and sentenced her to 16 months of incarceration plus two more years of supervised release. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, adopting a theory that Rico's abscondment 'tolled' the clock, meaning her supervised release term continued to run until she was caught. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split on whether abscondment automatically extends a supervised release term.
Justice Gorsuch, writing for the Court, rejected the Ninth Circuit's 'tolling' theory, clarifying that the rule effectively extends the supervised release period beyond what a judge ordered rather than pausing it. The Court analyzed the Sentencing Reform Act, noting that it sets fixed statutory maximums for supervised release terms under 18 U.S.C. §3583 and §3624 without providing for automatic extensions due to abscondment. The Act specifies that supervised release begins on the day of release from imprisonment and generally ends after one, three, or five years depending on the offense severity. The Court observed that the Act provides specific mechanisms for extending or revoking supervised release, such as requiring a hearing and considering sentencing factors under §3583(e)(2), or allowing revocation proceedings after expiration only for matters arising before expiration if a warrant or summons issued during the term under §3583(i). The Court found that the Ninth Circuit's rule disregards these specific limits, allowing extensions beyond statutory maximums without a hearing or warrant. The Court also addressed the government's arguments, rejecting the claim that the Act implies a rule where absconders receive no credit for time served while on the run. The Court noted that the government's theory would treat Rico as both off and on supervised release simultaneously. Furthermore, the Court distinguished precedent like Mont v. United States and United States v. Johnson, explaining that they do not support an automatic extension rule. The government's reliance on common-law principles regarding escaped prisoners was also rejected, as the Act already provides sufficient tools to ensure defendants do not profit from violations without needing to automatically extend the term beyond the court's order. The Court concluded that if the warrant-or-summons requirement in §3583(i) creates policy difficulties, the proper remedy lies with Congress, not the courts.
The decision reverses the Ninth Circuit's judgment, meaning defendants cannot be punished for new crimes committed after their supervised release term has expired based on the theory that abscondment extended the term. District courts must now adhere strictly to the expiration dates set by the original sentencing order. While courts can still revoke supervised release for violations that occurred before expiration if a warrant or summons was issued during the term, they cannot treat post-expiration conduct as a violation of the expired term. The ruling leaves open the question of how courts should handle violations that occur late in a term but are discovered after expiration, suggesting that any policy adjustments to the warrant-or-summons requirement must come from Congress.