Dwayne Barrett was convicted of Hobbs Act robbery, using a firearm during that crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i), and causing death in violation of § 924(j). The underlying robbery resulted in a fatality. The District Court had sentenced Barrett to a total of 90 years, merging the § 924(c) conviction into the § 924(j) conviction but imposing separate sentences. On remand following the Supreme Court's decision in Lora v. United States, the Second Circuit vacated the sentence and instructed the District Court to impose separate convictions and sentences for both § 924(c) and § 924(j). The Second Circuit reasoned that while the provisions overlap under the Blockburger test, Lora indicated they were separate offenses for which Congress authorized cumulative punishments. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among the Courts of Appeals on this issue.
The Court began by acknowledging that § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and § 924(j) define the same offense under the Blockburger test, as the latter is a lesser included offense of the former. Under the Blockburger presumption, Congress is presumed not to intend to punish the same offense under two different statutes unless it plainly expresses a contrary intent. The Court found no such clear expression of intent in the statutory text. While Congress used 'in addition to' language to authorize cumulative convictions between § 924(c) and its predicate offenses, it used no similar language regarding the interplay between § 924(c) and § 924(j). The Court rejected the argument that the consecutive-sentence mandate in § 924(c) implied authorization for dual convictions, noting that sentence arrangement is a separate inquiry from the permissibility of multiple convictions. Furthermore, the Court found that the structural differences between the two provisions, such as § 924(j) offering a menu of penalties including the death penalty rather than mandatory minimums, suggested Congress intended prosecutors to choose one or the other, not to stack them. The Court distinguished Garrett v. United States, noting that the continuing nature of the offense in Garrett justified cumulative punishment, whereas this case involved the classic relationship of a lesser included offense to a greater one. Applying the rule of lenity, the Court concluded that the ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the defendant, allowing only one conviction.
Defendants convicted of a single act that violates both § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and § 924(j) will now be subject to only one conviction. Prosecutors must choose which provision to charge, as they can no longer secure cumulative convictions for the same conduct. The case is remanded to the Second Circuit for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, requiring the District Court to vacate the separate conviction and sentence for one of the provisions. The decision leaves open the question of whether Congress could constitutionally authorize such cumulative punishments, as the Court resolved the case on statutory grounds.