Michael Bowe is a federal prisoner serving a 24-year sentence, which includes a mandatory 10-year consecutive term imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for using a firearm during a crime of violence. To support this sentence, Bowe's underlying robbery convictions must qualify as 'crimes of violence.' However, recent Supreme Court decisions, United States v. Davis and United States v. Taylor, have called into question whether the specific offenses Bowe committed meet this definition. Bowe sought postconviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, but because he had previously filed motions, he needed authorization from the Eleventh Circuit to file a second or successive motion. The Eleventh Circuit denied his request, relying on § 2244(b)(1) to bar his claim as a 'do-over' of a previously presented issue. This created a circuit split, as some courts apply this bar to federal prisoners while others do not. Bowe petitioned the Supreme Court to resolve the split and clarify the procedural rules governing federal habeas petitions.
The Court addressed two primary questions regarding the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). First, the Court determined it had jurisdiction to hear the case. The Government argued that § 2244(b)(3)(E) bars Supreme Court review of authorization decisions for second or successive filings. The Court held that this bar does not apply to federal prisoners. While § 2244 governs state prisoners and explicitly bars certiorari review, § 2255(h) governs federal prisoners and only cross-references § 2244 for the specific procedures on how a panel certifies a filing. The Court reasoned that Congress must speak clearly to strip the Court of its certiorari jurisdiction. Because § 2255(h)'s cross-reference is narrow and specific to certification procedures, it does not clearly incorporate the post-certification bar in § 2244(b)(3)(E). Second, the Court addressed whether § 2244(b)(1) applies to federal prisoners. This provision bars claims presented in a prior application. The Court found that the text of § 2244(b)(1) specifically refers to 'habeas corpus application under section 2254,' which applies only to state prisoners. The Court rejected the argument that § 2255(h)'s cross-reference incorporates this substantive bar, noting that § 2255(h) contains its own distinct substantive requirements for successive motions. The Court emphasized that AEDPA treats state and federal prisoners differently, often imposing higher hurdles on state prisoners, and that Congress did not intend to extend the 'do-over' bar to federal prisoners.
Federal prisoners can now seek Supreme Court review if a court of appeals denies them authorization to file a second or successive § 2255 motion. Additionally, federal prisoners are no longer barred from raising claims in successive motions that they previously raised, provided they meet the substantive gatekeeping requirements of § 2255(h) (new evidence or new rule of constitutional law). The case is remanded to the district court to evaluate Bowe's substantive claim that his § 924(c) conviction lacks a valid predicate offense. This decision resolves a circuit split and alters the procedural landscape for federal habeas litigants.