Petitioner Ellingburg committed a crime in 1996, prior to the enactment of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA). After the MVRA became law, he was sentenced and ordered to pay $7,567.25 in restitution to the victim. Ellingburg challenged this continued obligation, arguing that applying the MVRA to his pre-enactment conduct violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected this argument, concluding that MVRA restitution is a civil remedy rather than criminal punishment, and therefore not subject to Ex Post Facto restrictions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this threshold question of statutory construction.
The Court, in an opinion delivered by Justice Kavanaugh, held unanimously that restitution under the MVRA is criminal punishment. The analysis began with the principle that determining whether a law is civil or criminal is a question of statutory construction requiring an examination of the statute's text and structure. The Court found that the MVRA makes it abundantly clear that restitution is a penalty. First, the statute explicitly labels restitution as a 'penalty' for a criminal 'offense.' Second, restitution is imposed only against a criminal defendant following a conviction, and it is ordered at sentencing alongside other criminal punishments like imprisonment and fines. Third, the proceeding is adversarial between the Government and the defendant, not the victim. Fourth, the MVRA regime is codified in Title 18, 'Crimes and Criminal Procedure,' specifically within chapters dedicated to sentencing provisions. Finally, the Court noted that its precedents, including Manrique v. United States, have consistently understood MVRA restitution as part of the criminal sentence. While the Act serves a compensatory purpose for victims, the Court clarified that Congress intended it to both punish and compensate, and the intent to impose punishment is sufficient to classify it as criminal. The Court distinguished this from civil sex offender registration schemes, noting that the MVRA's features—such as the government's role as the adverse party and the potential for imprisonment for non-payment—demonstrate its penal nature.
The judgment of the Eighth Circuit is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion. This ruling means that defendants who committed crimes before the MVRA's 1996 enactment cannot be ordered to pay restitution under that Act if doing so would impose a penalty retroactively. It clarifies that MVRA restitution is subject to Ex Post Facto challenges, potentially opening the door for relief for individuals sentenced under the Act for pre-enactment conduct. The Court left open the possibility that other restitution statutes might be civil, but confirmed that the specific text and structure of the MVRA render it criminal.