The Unkechaug Indian Nation and its Chief Harry B. Wallace challenged the enforcement of New York State Department of Environmental Conservation regulations that prohibit the harvesting of juvenile American eels, known as glass eels. These regulations were implemented to address conservation concerns and over-harvesting driven by high international demand. The Nation argued that a 1676 agreement, known as the Andros Order, issued by the Royal Governor of New York, granted them the right to fish freely and that this agreement functioned as a federal treaty. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the state from enforcing these regulations against them in their customary off-reservation fishing waters. The District Court granted summary judgment to the state, ruling that the Andros Order was not federal law and did not preempt state regulations. The Nation appealed, arguing that the Order was binding under the Constitution's Supremacy Clause and Debts and Engagements Clause.
The Court addressed three primary issues. First, regarding sovereign immunity, the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment bars claims against the state agency, the Department of Environmental Conservation. However, applying the Ex parte Young exception, the Court found that the Nation could proceed with claims for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief against Commissioner Seggos in his official capacity. The Court distinguished this case from Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Idaho, noting that the Nation was not seeking to divest the state of ownership of the waters but rather to prevent interference with their established right to fish. Second, the Court addressed procedural arguments regarding the District Court's failure to rule on Daubert motions and privilege disputes before summary judgment. The Court found no abuse of discretion, as the expert testimony and privileged documents were not relevant to the legal question of whether the Andros Order constituted federal law. Third, and most critically, the Court analyzed whether the Andros Order was binding federal law. The Court examined the Debts and Engagements Clause and the Supremacy Clause of Article VI. It concluded that the Debts and Engagements Clause only applies to engagements made during the Confederal period, not those made by the British Crown nearly a century prior. Similarly, the Supremacy Clause only elevates treaties made under the authority of the United States to the status of supreme law. Since the Andros Order was executed in 1676 by the British Crown before the United States existed, it was never made under federal authority and was never ratified by the United States. Therefore, it does not preempt New York's fishing regulations.
The decision affirms the District Court's summary judgment, meaning New York's regulations prohibiting the harvesting of glass eels remain fully enforceable against members of the Unkechaug Nation in off-reservation waters. The ruling clarifies that pre-Confederation agreements with the British Crown do not automatically become federal treaties under the Constitution. While the Nation can still pursue injunctive relief against the Commissioner for ongoing violations of federal law, they cannot rely on the 1676 Order as a preemptive federal shield against state fishing regulations. The case leaves open the question of whether other pre-Confederation agreements might have different legal status if ratified later, but establishes that the mere existence of such an order does not create federal law.