Every decision we've summarized — searchable, filterable, neutral.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of a petition for review, holding that Miranda warnings and the exclusionary rule do not apply in civil immigration removal proceedings. The court rejected the petitioner's argument that an administrative arrest warrant transformed the civil nature of the proceeding into a criminal one.
The Second Circuit reversed a district court dismissal, clarifying that a state suing in parens patriae need not prove a discriminatory policy or practice to establish standing. The court held that New York sufficiently alleged that a school district's failure to address repeated sexual assaults and harassment affected a substantial segment of the student population.
The Second Circuit affirmed a conviction for unlawful reentry, ruling that defects in a Notice to Appear did not strip the Immigration Court of jurisdiction. The court also rejected an equal protection challenge, finding insufficient evidence that the illegal reentry statute was enacted with discriminatory intent.
The D.C. Circuit affirmed Thomas Robertson's conviction for obstructing the Electoral College vote certification, ruling that his participation in the January 6 riot constituted acting "corruptly" through independently felonious means. The court further rejected Robertson's sentencing challenges, upholding an 87-month prison term based on the substantial interference caused to the administration of justice.
The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review, holding that the stop-time rule for cancellation of removal is triggered by the date a criminal offense is committed, not the date of conviction. This ruling confirms that a lawful permanent resident is ineligible for relief if the offense occurred within seven years of admission, even if the conviction finalizes after that period.
The Ninth Circuit held that dismissing a prisoner's first habeas motion because the claims were legally non-cognizable constitutes an adjudication on the merits, barring any later-filed motion on those same grounds as successive. However, the court transferred a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the first motion to the district court, as that specific claim could not have been raised previously.
The Second Circuit affirmed the denial of Abderrahmane Farhane's habeas petition, holding that his counsel was not ineffective for failing to warn him about denaturalization risks. The court ruled that civil denaturalization is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea, meaning the Sixth Amendment does not require defense attorneys to advise on such immigration consequences.
The Ninth Circuit held that the Board of Immigration Appeals erred by relying on outdated precedent to classify Washington's current reckless driving statute as a crime involving moral turpitude. The court found that the statute's 'reckless manner' element reflects a lower mental state than the 'wanton or willful disregard' standard required by prior BIA rulings.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the Board of Immigration Appeals, holding that an immigration judge violated due process by rigidly enforcing a filing deadline without allowing a window filing. The court found the proceedings fundamentally unfair because the deadline was ambiguous and the judge refused to accept the application while still on the bench.
The Second Circuit affirmed a district court judgment holding that Conagen was not liable for breach of contract after negotiations for an exclusivity arrangement failed. The court ruled that the executed Term Sheet created a binding duty to negotiate in good faith but did not bind the parties to the specific exclusivity terms sought by Givaudan.
