Thomas Robertson, a former police sergeant and Army veteran, traveled to Washington, D.C., on January 6, 2021, to protest the certification of the 2020 presidential election results. He arrived with a large wooden stick, gas masks, and companions, joining a mob that breached the U.S. Capitol. During the riot, Robertson struck a police officer with his stick, blocked law enforcement, and entered the Capitol Crypt, where he posed for photos and banged his stick on the floor. His actions contributed to forcing the House and Senate to suspend the vote certification for several hours. Robertson was convicted on multiple counts, including obstructing the vote certification under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2). On appeal, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the "corruptly" element and argued that the district court erred in applying specific sentencing enhancements for obstruction of the "administration of justice."
The court addressed two primary issues. First, regarding the definition of "corruptly" in 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2), the court rejected Robertson's argument that the term requires proof of a specific intent to obtain a financial or personal benefit. Citing Supreme Court precedent in Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States and D.C. Circuit precedent in United States v. North, the court held that "corruptly" encompasses acting with a wrongful purpose or through independently unlawful means. The court reasoned that Robertson's conduct—using a dangerous weapon, assaulting officers, and trespassing in a restricted building—constituted independently felonious means. Therefore, the jury could find he acted corruptly simply by choosing illegal means to obstruct the proceeding. The court also clarified that the concurring opinion in United States v. Fischer regarding the "unlawful benefit" requirement was not binding precedent, as it was not part of the majority's holding. Second, regarding sentencing, the court reviewed Robertson's claim that the "administration of justice" does not include the Electoral College vote certification. The court found no plain error, noting that the ordinary meaning of "justice" includes the fair administration of laws by a legislative body. Since the certification is a pivotal constitutional moment, obstructing it constitutes interference with the administration of justice, justifying the sentencing enhancements for physical injury and substantial interference.
The decision affirms that obstruction of the Electoral College vote certification under § 1512(c)(2) can be proven by demonstrating the use of independently felonious means, such as assault or trespass, without needing to prove a specific intent to gain a personal benefit. This interpretation broadens the scope of the statute compared to the dissent's view, ensuring that violent obstruction of the vote count is punishable as a felony. The sentence of 87 months remains in effect, and the ruling clarifies that the certification process is part of the "administration of justice" for sentencing enhancement purposes. No remand was ordered.
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