4th Cir.

S.W. v. Pressley Ridge

March 16, 2026 ·25-1791 ·Panel Decision ·Toby Heytens · By Raj Patel

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a sexual abuse survivor's state-law tort claims against a residential treatment facility, ruling they were time-barred under West Virginia's two-year statute of limitations. The court clarified that the state's tolling statute for intentional concealment does not apply to claims based on negligent supervision or hiring.

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The plaintiff, now an adult, lived at a residential treatment facility operated by the defendant, Pressley Ridge, in 2004 and 2005. During that time, the plaintiff alleged they were repeatedly sexually abused by a house counselor. Years later, the plaintiff sued the facility under West Virginia law, asserting claims for negligence, negligent supervision, negligent hiring, training, and retention, and breach of fiduciary duty. The defendant moved to dismiss these claims, arguing they were barred by West Virginia's two-year statute of limitations for personal injury. The plaintiff countered that a specific tolling statute extended the deadline because the defendant 'aided, abetted, or concealed' the sexual abuse. The district court agreed with the defendant, dismissing the claims as untimely, and the plaintiff appealed to the Fourth Circuit.

The Fourth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo, focusing on whether the complaint sufficiently alleged facts to trigger the tolling statute found in West Virginia Code Section 55-2-15(a). The court addressed three arguments raised by the plaintiff. First, the court rejected the claim that the district court required the 'magic words' 'aided, abetted, or concealed' to appear in the complaint. The appellate court clarified that the district court's order merely noted the complaint failed to plausibly allege facts establishing that the defendant engaged in such conduct, consistent with the pleading standards of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. Second, the court addressed the plaintiff's argument that the statutory terms 'aided, abetted, or concealed' include negligent conduct. The court held this argument was forfeited because the plaintiff never raised it in the district court. While the plaintiff had made a passing reference to negligence in a paragraph primarily arguing about the timing of discovery, the court found this insufficient to preserve the statutory interpretation issue. Consequently, the court declined to decide whether negligence could satisfy the tolling statute, noting the plaintiff offered no authority to support such a reading. Third, the court rejected the argument that the district court should have granted leave to amend. The appellate court found that the plaintiff never formally moved for leave to amend under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 or submitted a proposed amended complaint. Citing Fourth Circuit precedent, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant a request to amend that was not properly made as a motion.

The decision affirms that survivors of sexual abuse must allege intentional concealment to toll the statute of limitations in West Virginia; mere negligence in supervision or hiring is insufficient. The ruling leaves open the question of whether the statutory terms could ever encompass negligent conduct, but requires that such an argument be raised in the trial court to be considered. Practically, this limits the ability of plaintiffs to extend the filing deadline against institutions based solely on failures of oversight, requiring specific allegations of intentional acts to aid or hide the abuse.

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