Amanda Tostado pleaded guilty to two drug offenses and was sentenced in the Eastern District of North Carolina. During the sentencing hearing, the district judge orally imposed a warrantless-search condition that allowed suspicionless searches only in specific circumstances, explicitly citing 'safety issues' as the sole example where no suspicion was required. However, the written judgment entered the same day included a broader condition, permitting suspicionless searches by a probation officer whenever they were acting in the 'lawful discharge of the officer's supervision functions.' Tostado appealed, arguing that the written judgment imposed a new, unannounced condition that violated the rule that all discretionary conditions must be announced in open court.
Judge Heytens, writing for the panel, applied the rule established in United States v. Rogers and United States v. Singletary, which mandates that the oral sentence controls over any contrary or additional language in the written judgment. The court found a material discrepancy between the oral and written terms. The oral pronouncement limited suspicionless searches to 'safety issues,' whereas the written judgment expanded this to any activity within the 'lawful discharge of supervision functions,' a scope that sweeps far beyond mere safety concerns. The court rejected the government's argument that the oral statement was merely an example and that the written judgment clarified an ambiguity. The court reasoned that the written judgment did not clarify an ambiguity but rather added a new, substantial restriction on liberty that the defendant was not present to hear. The court also rejected the government's arguments regarding waiver and harmless error. It held that a defendant need not object at sentencing to preserve a Rogers-Singletary claim because such errors are only discoverable after the judgment is entered. Furthermore, the court ruled that a plea agreement cannot override the requirement that discretionary conditions be orally announced, as courts—not parties—impose sentences. Finally, the court addressed a standing issue, holding that a defendant has standing to appeal a written judgment containing unannounced conditions because those conditions create a practical threat of enforcement and incarceration, even if they are ultimately deemed nullities.
The case is remanded to the district court for resentencing to align the written judgment with the orally articulated conditions of supervised release. This decision reinforces that the oral pronouncement is the controlling sentence and that defendants have standing to challenge written judgments containing unannounced conditions. It clarifies that plea agreements cannot waive the right to have discretionary conditions orally announced at sentencing. The decision leaves open the question of whether a defendant can ever validly waive the right to be present for sentencing via a plea agreement, but it confirms that such a waiver was not effective in this instance.
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