11th Cir.

Kirk Anthony Bennett v. United States of America, D. Swain Corrections Officer, Federal Bureau of Prisons

March 10, 2026 ·5:23-cv-00224-MCR-MJF ·Per Curiam · By Aisha Johnson

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a pro se prisoner's Eighth Amendment Bivens claim, ruling that courts must interpret pleadings based on the specific causes of action asserted rather than rewriting them as alternative theories. The court also upheld the denial of the prisoner's request for appointed counsel, finding the argument waived due to a failure to object to the magistrate judge's order within the required timeframe.

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Kirk Anthony Bennett, a prisoner, filed a pro se lawsuit alleging that a corrections officer emptied a can of pepper spray into his cell, violating his Eighth Amendment rights. Bennett framed this claim specifically as a Bivens action against the officer. He also repeatedly requested court-appointed counsel to assist with his litigation. Under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, the district court was required to screen his complaint sua sponte. The court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. On appeal, Bennett argued that the district court erred by not construing his allegations as a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) instead of a Bivens claim, and that the magistrate judge abused its discretion by denying his request for appointed counsel.

The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo and the denial of counsel for abuse of discretion. On the substantive claim, the court reiterated that while pro se pleadings are liberally construed, courts do not serve as de facto counsel or rewrite arguments for parties. The court held that the relevant question is what claims the party actually made, not what claims could have been made. Bennett explicitly labeled his claim against the officer as a 'Bivens Action.' The district court had previously reviewed an earlier version of the complaint, informed Bennett of the limited scenarios where Bivens claims succeed, and provided opportunities to amend. Bennett amended his complaint three times in response to these warnings but failed to successfully state a claim. The court refused to rewrite his Bivens claim into an FTCA claim. Regarding the request for counsel, the court noted that a motion to appoint counsel is a nondispositive order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a). A party must object to such an order within 14 days of service to preserve the issue for appeal. Bennett failed to object to the magistrate judge's denial at all, thereby waiving the argument on appeal.

This decision reinforces the principle that pro se litigants must articulate the specific legal theories they wish to pursue, as courts will not substitute alternative causes of action like the FTCA for a failed Bivens claim. It also serves as a strict reminder of procedural deadlines in civil cases, specifically that failure to object to a magistrate judge's nondispositive order within 14 days results in a waiver of that issue on appeal. The judgment of the district court is affirmed, leaving the dismissal of Bennett's claims in place.

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