Background
Sulayman Sarr, a native of The Gambia, was convicted in federal court of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. Following his release from prison, he was placed in removal proceedings. Sarr applied for withholding of removal, claiming fear of harm upon return to The Gambia. The Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals denied his application, finding his drug trafficking conviction constituted a particularly serious crime that rendered him ineligible for relief.
The court’s reasoning
The panel concluded that under Matter of Y-L-, the Attorney General established a strong presumption that drug trafficking offenses are particularly serious crimes. This presumption triggers the regulatory presumption that the alien is a danger to the community. The court rejected Sarr’s argument that the agency must separately determine dangerousness, noting that Y-L- overruled the prior Frentescu framework for drug trafficking cases. The court also held that the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright did not require overruling Miguel-Miguel v. Gonzales because statutory stare decisis protects prior holdings even if the interpretive methodology has changed.
Though we relied there on Chevron’s now-overruled interpretive methodology, Miguel-Miguel is still subject to statutory stare decisis.
Sarr v. Blanche, 2026 WL 3456789 (9th Cir. July 7, 2026)
What it means going forward
The decision reinforces the Ninth Circuit’s precedent that drug trafficking aggravated felonies are categorically treated as particularly serious crimes for withholding of removal purposes, limiting the ability of noncitizens to rebut the dangerousness presumption in such cases.