3rd Cir.

MIRYAM PAOLA SOLER-MARTINEZ; D. P.-S v. ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

April 2, 2026 ·25-2754 ·Panel Decision · By Aisha Johnson

The Third Circuit granted the Government's motion for summary action, denying a Colombian national's petition for review of her removal order. The court affirmed the lower agencies' findings that the petitioner failed to exhaust her claims regarding a new particular social group and did not adequately challenge the legal basis for the denial of her asylum applications.

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Miryam Paola Soler-Martinez, a citizen of Colombia who entered the United States illegally, faced removal proceedings after being charged with unlawful entry. She applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture, claiming fear of mistreatment by paramilitary organizations FARC and ELN. She alleged that these groups had previously targeted her family and later threatened her husband after stealing his car. An Immigration Judge found her testimony credible but denied relief, ruling that her proposed particular social group—victims of armed conflict targeted for refusing criminal activities—was not cognizable and that there was no nexus between the harm and a protected ground. The BIA affirmed these denials, noting that Soler-Martinez had waived her Convention Against Torture claim on appeal and had not properly raised a new particular social group theory before the Immigration Judge.

The Third Circuit applied a summary action procedure, agreeing with the Government that the petition lacked merit and presented no substantial question. The court focused on the exhaustion doctrine, noting that Soler-Martinez attempted to raise a new particular social group defined as 'family members of persons who were victims of violence' for the first time in her response to the summary action motion. Because she did not propose this group before the Immigration Judge or the BIA, the court declined to consider it. Regarding the issues that were properly before the court, the court found no error in the lower agencies' reasoning. The court explained that particular social groups must exist independently of the persecution suffered, and Soler-Martinez had improperly defined her group in terms of that persecution. Furthermore, the court accepted the finding that recent threats against her husband were motivated by financial gain regarding the stolen car, rather than her family's membership in a protected group. The court also noted that the Immigration Judge had sua sponte considered another potential group but that Soler-Martinez had not challenged that ruling on appeal.

The order of removal against Soler-Martinez stands, and her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture relief remain denied. The decision reinforces the requirement that asylum seekers must exhaust all particular social group arguments before the Immigration Judge to preserve them for appellate review. It also clarifies that groups defined solely by the persecution suffered are not cognizable and that harm motivated by financial gain does not satisfy the nexus requirement for asylum. Soler-Martinez's recourse for new evidence or claims of ineffective assistance of counsel would be to file a motion to reopen with the BIA, not to seek review in the Third Circuit.

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