3rd Cir.

DAWN WALEGA v. JUSTIN MACGREGOR, MPA Deputy Director for Human Resources; WILLIAM BROWNING, Director of OYFS and Human Services; LACKAWANNA COUNTY GOVERNMENT OFFICE; KERRI BROWN...

DAWN WALEGA v. JUSTIN MACGREGOR, MPA Deputy Director for Human Resources; WILLIAM BROWNING, Director of OYFS and Human Services; LACKAWANNA COUNTY GOVERNMENT OFFICE; KERRI BROWN…

April 7, 2026 ·25-2732 ·Panel Decision · By Aisha Johnson

The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Lackawanna County, ruling that the appellant failed to prove her termination was motivated by age. The court found no evidence that the employer's documented performance-based actions were a pretext for age discrimination.

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Dawn Walega, a pro se appellant, worked as an administrative officer for Lackawanna County starting in January 2016. She turned 40 shortly after beginning her employment. Over the next year, Walega faced multiple disciplinary actions for chronic lateness, unauthorized breaks, and failure to complete job assignments. In November 2017, she reported to her supervisor that other staff members were engaging in fraudulent leave activity. Shortly after this report, she received written warnings and was suspended. In January 2018, she signed a final opportunity agreement requiring daily meetings with her supervisor to discuss her work. After she admitted to missing these meetings, her employment was terminated in February 2018. Her age was not discussed during the disciplinary hearings. She was replaced by a 61-year-old employee. In November 2021, Walega filed a federal lawsuit alleging age discrimination and retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The district court granted summary judgment for the County, and Walega appealed.

The Third Circuit reviewed the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the standard that summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute of material fact. The court addressed two primary claims: age discrimination and retaliation. First, regarding age discrimination, the court explained that to establish a prima facie case, an employee must show circumstances that raise an inference of age discrimination. The court found Walega failed this burden because she could not demonstrate that her termination was motivated by age. A critical factual point was that she was replaced by an individual nearly twenty years her senior, which contradicts the typical inference of age bias. Furthermore, the record contained extensive evidence of documented performance issues, including lateness and failure to adhere to a disciplinary agreement. Second, regarding retaliation, the court applied the three-part test requiring proof of protected activity, adverse action, and a causal connection. While Walega testified she reported fraudulent leave activity, the court found no evidence that she framed this report as a discriminatory practice based on age. Additionally, the disciplinary warnings regarding her performance predated her report, undermining any claim that the report caused her termination. The court emphasized that a party opposing summary judgment cannot rest on mere allegations in their complaint but must set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.

The decision affirms the lower court's ruling, leaving the summary judgment in favor of Lackawanna County in place. For future litigants, this reinforces the requirement that employees must provide specific factual evidence, beyond mere allegations, to survive summary judgment in employment discrimination cases. It highlights that replacing an older employee with a significantly older individual negates the inference of age discrimination. The court also clarified that reporting general misconduct, without linking it to a discriminatory motive, does not constitute protected activity under the ADEA for retaliation claims.

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