3rd Cir.

JENIQUA BRADLEY v. JUDGE KENNETH LENKER

February 26, 2026 ·25-2557 ·Panel Decision · By Aisha Johnson

The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Jeniqua Bradley's Section 1983 lawsuit against a Magisterial District Judge. The court held that judicial immunity protected the judge because entering a default judgment is a judicial act performed within his jurisdiction.

Listen to this decision 0:00 / 3:20

Jeniqua Bradley, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Judge Kenneth Lenker, a Magisterial District Judge in Dauphin County, Pennsylvania. Bradley alleged that Judge Lenker improperly entered a default judgment against her in a separate civil action concerning a credit card balance. She claimed she was not properly served in the underlying case and that the judge failed to consider her jurisdictional objections before ruling. The District Court, screening the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), adopted a Magistrate Judge's recommendation to dismiss the case, concluding that Judge Lenker was entitled to judicial immunity. The District Court dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice, finding that further amendment would be futile. Bradley appealed this dismissal to the Third Circuit.

The Third Circuit applied the doctrine of judicial immunity, which generally shields judges from suits for money damages. The court noted that this immunity applies equally to judges of limited jurisdiction, such as magisterial district judges. The court explained that immunity only fails if a judge is sued for nonjudicial actions or for actions taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. The court found that neither exception applied here. First, the entry of a default judgment is 'unquestionably a judicial act.' Second, Judge Lenker did not act in the clear absence of jurisdiction because Pennsylvania law authorizes magisterial district judges to exercise jurisdiction over civil claims not exceeding $12,000. The court emphasized that a judge is not deprived of immunity simply because the action taken was in error, done maliciously, or in excess of authority. Since the judge's actions fell within the scope of judicial immunity, the District Court properly dismissed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), which requires dismissal when a defendant is immune from monetary relief.

The decision reinforces the broad scope of judicial immunity for magisterial district judges in Pennsylvania, even when they make procedural errors like entering a default judgment without proper service. It clarifies that plaintiffs cannot bypass immunity by alleging errors in judicial discretion or jurisdictional mistakes, provided the judge had subject matter jurisdiction over the type of case. The case was remanded with instructions to dismiss, and no further amendment to the complaint was permitted. The court explicitly took no position on the merits of the underlying default judgment itself.

Play