Maria Rosa Caguana Duchi, a native of Ecuador who entered the U.S. without inspection in 1995, was placed in removal proceedings in 2006 and ordered removed in 2007. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed her appeal in 2008. Fifteen years later, in 2023, Caguana's U.S.-citizen daughter obtained an approved Form I-130 petition, making Caguana potentially eligible to adjust her status. Relying on this new eligibility, Caguana filed a motion for the BIA to sua sponte reopen her immigration proceedings. The BIA denied the motion, ruling it was untimely and that Caguana failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances warranting the exercise of the BIA's discretionary authority. Caguana then petitioned the Third Circuit for review of the BIA's order.
Circuit Judge Freeman, writing for the panel, explained that under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), a motion to reopen must generally be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision. After that window closes, the BIA retains unfettered discretion to reopen only in exceptional situations. The court reiterated that it generally lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA's exercise of this unfettered discretion. However, two exceptions exist: the 'settled course' exception and the 'incorrect legal premise' exception. Under the settled course exception, jurisdiction exists if the BIA has limited its discretion via a policy, rule, or settled course of adjudication that is clearly defined and tailored to the petitioner's circumstances. Caguana argued that the BIA had a settled course of granting such motions when noncitizens become eligible to adjust status. The court rejected this, noting that Caguana cited cases involving continuances or timely motions, which were not tailored to her situation. The court also distinguished a single unpublished decision where an untimely motion was granted, stating that 'one favorable exercise of discretion does not a settled course make.' Regarding the incorrect legal premise exception, the court found the BIA's decision was not based on a legal error. The BIA recognized its discretionary authority but determined that becoming eligible for relief fifteen years after the 90-day window was not an exceptional situation. Citing Darby v. Att'y Gen., the court held that where there is no legal determination, there is no legal error. Caguana also relied on Ceta v. Mukasey, which allowed review when a noncitizen became eligible during pending proceedings. The court distinguished Ceta, noting Caguana's eligibility arose fifteen years after her proceedings concluded, and she remained in the country during that time.
The petition is dismissed, leaving the BIA's denial of the motion to reopen in effect. Caguana cannot obtain relief through this appeal. The decision reinforces the strict jurisdictional bar on reviewing discretionary denials of untimely motions to reopen unless a petitioner can demonstrate a clearly defined settled course of adjudication or a specific legal error by the BIA. The case highlights the difficulty for noncitizens seeking to reopen proceedings long after a final order of removal, even if new family-based eligibility arises.
Podcast (federal-narrative-summaries): Play in new window | Download