Carlton Rembert, a legally blind man living in Virginia, was tried in federal court in Pennsylvania on charges related to defrauding incapacitated persons. The case stemmed from a scheme involving Rembert, Gloria Byars, and Alesha Mitchell. Byars, a former office manager for a Pennsylvania guardianship firm, created competing businesses and used her access to ward accounts to funnel money into businesses owned by herself, Mitchell, and Rembert. Rembert opened five bank accounts for his medical-billing businesses and deposited over $695,000 in checks drawn on wards' accounts, many of which were cashed or withdrawn in amounts under $10,000 to avoid reporting requirements. Although Rembert lived in Virginia and his businesses were based there, the prosecution argued the scheme involved Pennsylvania wards and financial institutions. Rembert filed pretrial motions to transfer the trial to Virginia for convenience and to suppress bank records obtained from PNC Bank. He also moved for acquittal after the trial, arguing the evidence was insufficient, and later moved for a new trial, claiming unfair prejudice from the testimony of a co-defendant who had pleaded guilty. The District Court denied all these motions, and a jury convicted Rembert on four counts.
The Third Circuit addressed four distinct issues. First, regarding the motion to transfer venue under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 21(b), the court applied the ten factors from Platt v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. While the District Court acknowledged that Rembert's location and the expense to the parties favored a transfer to Virginia, it found that six other factors, including the location of witnesses and documents, favored keeping the case in Pennsylvania. The appellate court concluded that the District Court's balancing of these factors was not an abuse of discretion, noting that the Constitution does not guarantee a defendant a trial in their home district. Second, on the motion to suppress bank records, the court distinguished between the 2019 search warrant for Byars's accounts and the 2020 grand jury subpoena for Rembert's records. The court held that the Fourth Amendment does not protect a depositor's records from a grand jury subpoena issued to a third-party bank, citing United States v. Miller. Furthermore, even if the warrant for Byars's records were flawed, Rembert could not claim 'fruit of the poisonous tree' because he had no Fourth Amendment rights in a third party's records. Third, the court reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence for the four guilty verdicts. For conspiracy, the court noted the superseding indictment charged a two-person conspiracy between Rembert and Byars, making Mitchell's involvement unnecessary for conviction. For bank fraud, the court found sufficient evidence that Rembert, as the sole authorized user, deposited checks from ward accounts and that his businesses provided no services to the wards, satisfying the requirement of a fraudulent scheme. For wire fraud, the court found that documents showing Rembert's signature and the transmission of check images were sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find guilt. Finally, regarding the motion for a new trial, the court rejected the argument that the co-defendant's testimony was unfairly prejudicial, stating that her testimony regarding her own scheme with Byars had probative value in helping the jury infer Rembert's similar conduct.
The decision affirms Rembert's five-year prison sentence, supervised release, and restitution order. It reinforces the Third Circuit's deference to District Courts in venue transfer decisions and clarifies that defendants cannot suppress bank records obtained via grand jury subpoena from third parties. The ruling leaves open the question of whether similar schemes targeting incapacitated persons in one state but executed by defendants in another can be successfully prosecuted in the state where the victims reside.
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