Christopher Massey, a white male who served for decades in the Bergenfield Police Department and held the rank of Deputy Chief, was denied a promotion to Chief of Police in 2019 in favor of Mustafa Rabboh, an Arab-Muslim male. Massey filed claims under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging that the Borough Council discriminated against him based on his race and religion. The District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants, ruling that Massey failed to meet the 'Background Circumstances Rule' required for majority-group plaintiffs under New Jersey law and that his other federal claims were procedurally barred. The Third Circuit reviewed the case de novo to determine if the state law rule survived the U.S. Supreme Court's recent ruling in Ames and whether the record contained sufficient evidence to proceed to trial.
The court began by addressing the 'Background Circumstances Rule,' a judge-made doctrine in New Jersey requiring majority-group plaintiffs to show they were victimized by an 'unusual employer' who discriminates against the majority. Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Ames v. Ohio Dep't of Youth Servs., which struck down the federal version of this rule under Title VII, the Third Circuit predicted that the New Jersey Supreme Court would similarly invalidate the state rule. The court reasoned that the NJLAD and Title VII contain identical text prohibiting discrimination against 'any' person, leaving no room for heightened burdens based on majority status. The court noted that the rule is 'problematic,' 'vague,' and inconsistent with the statutory mandate to eradicate all discrimination. With the rule removed, the court applied the standard McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. It found that Massey established a prima facie case and that the defendants' proffered justifications—such as qualifications, interview performance, and diversity goals—were pretextual. The record contained direct evidence of discrimination, including a Borough Administrator stating the decision was 'all about race' and council members admitting they considered Rabboh's race and religion. The court concluded that a reasonable factfinder could infer that race and religion were motivating factors. Regarding the federal claims, the court held that Massey could proceed under § 1983 for an Equal Protection violation, rejecting the District Court's view that employment discrimination claims must be brought solely under Title VII. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the § 1981 claim against the municipality, noting that § 1983 provides the exclusive federal damages remedy for § 1981 violations against state actors.
The decision reverses the summary judgment on the NJLAD and Equal Protection claims, remanding the case for trial where a jury will determine if the defendants' stated reasons for the promotion were pretextual. It effectively eliminates the 'Background Circumstances Rule' for reverse discrimination claims in New Jersey, aligning state law with the federal standard set in Ames. The ruling clarifies that § 1983 remains a viable vehicle for employment discrimination claims based on Equal Protection violations, even when Title VII is also implicated. However, it reinforces that § 1981 cannot be used to sue municipalities for damages in this context, limiting the scope of that specific federal claim.