3rd Cir.

Aakash Dalal v. John L. Molinelli, et al.

March 2, 2026 ·24-2649 ·Panel Decision · By James Taylor

The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for law enforcement and prosecutors in a civil rights suit alleging a conspiracy to manufacture false charges. The court held that the plaintiff failed to provide persuasive evidence that the government fabricated evidence or lacked probable cause for his prosecution.

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Aakash Dalal, a Rutgers student, was arrested in 2012 following a series of anti-Semitic arson attacks on synagogues in New Jersey. While initially a witness, Dalal was arrested after a jailhouse informant, Whendel Stewart, claimed Dalal had discussed plans to bomb federal buildings and murder a specific prosecutor, Martin Delaney. Stewart provided handwritten notes and recorded conversations that formed the basis for new charges against Dalal, including conspiracy to murder and making terroristic threats. Dalal was denied bail and eventually sentenced to 35 years for the original arson charges, while the new murder charges were dismissed in 2017 due to the difficulty of securing Stewart's testimony. Dalal later sued the investigators and prosecutors, alleging they conspired to fabricate evidence and maliciously prosecute him to prevent his release on bail. The District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding no evidence of fabrication and sufficient probable cause for the charges. Dalal appealed, arguing the evidence was planted and the prosecution was baseless.

The Third Circuit, in a Per Curiam opinion, affirmed the District Court's ruling on three primary grounds. First, regarding the claim of fabricated evidence, the court applied the 'sham affidavit' doctrine. It noted that Dalal waited until the final stages of discovery to allege that documents were fabricated or that detectives admitted the charges were false, despite having access to the evidence for years. The court stated, 'A sham affidavit is a contradictory affidavit that indicates only that the affiant cannot maintain a consistent story or is willing to offer a statement solely for the purpose of defeating summary judgment.' The court found Dalal's new assertions unsupported by independent evidence and inconsistent with his prior deposition testimony. Second, the court analyzed the probable cause element of the malicious prosecution claim. It held that probable cause is not a high bar and exists if there is a 'fair probability' that a crime was committed. The court found that the informant's testimony was corroborated by Dalal's own handwritten notes found in his cell, which referenced the prosecutor's name and plans for violence. The court reasoned, 'The record also shows that the FBI and the U.S. Marshals started investigating Stewart’s letter in earnest immediately upon receiving it from the Immigration Court… That fact undermines Dalal’s theory that Appellees concocted the letter out of fear that his release was imminent.' Third, the court addressed the conspiracy claim under Section 1983. It reiterated that a conspiracy claim cannot stand without an underlying constitutional violation. Since the court found no fabrication and sufficient probable cause, there was no constitutional violation, dooming the conspiracy claim. The court concluded, 'Without an actual underlying constitutional violation, Dalal’s conspiracy claims necessarily fail as well.'

The decision reinforces the high bar for proving fabrication of evidence in civil rights cases, particularly when a plaintiff fails to raise specific allegations during discovery. It clarifies that probable cause for malicious prosecution claims can be established even when the primary evidence comes from a jailhouse informant, provided there is some corroboration, such as the defendant's own writings. The ruling effectively shields law enforcement and prosecutors from liability in cases where the plaintiff cannot produce independent evidence of bad faith fabrication.

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