This case originated from a dispute over an eviction in state court. The tenant, Shannon Perry, filed a federal lawsuit under the Fair Housing Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Violence Against Women Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because she proceeded in forma pauperis, the district court screened the complaint and allowed only the Fair Housing Act claim to proceed. While the tenant moved for a temporary restraining order to halt the eviction, she was evicted before the court could rule, leading the district court to deny the motion as moot. Subsequently, the defendants moved to dismiss the Fair Housing Act claim, and the court granted that motion. The tenant appealed, challenging the denial of the restraining order, the dismissal of her claim, and various procedural rulings regarding discovery and the appointment of counsel.
The Tenth Circuit addressed the appeal on several distinct grounds. First, regarding the temporary restraining order, the court applied the mootness doctrine, citing Tymiak v. Omodt, to hold that because the tenant was already evicted, the request for an injunction to prevent eviction was moot. Second, concerning the Fair Housing Act claim, the court rejected the tenant's argument that the district court erred in dismissing the claim after it survived initial screening. The court clarified that screening occurs without input from defendants, whereas a motion to dismiss allows for an adversarial presentation. The court noted that the tenant waived her argument by failing to raise it in her opening brief. Third, the court dismissed challenges to the dismissal of claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Double Jeopardy Clause because the tenant failed to explain why the district court's reasoning was erroneous. Fourth, the court found no error in the magistrate judge's recommendation of dismissal before discovery, as the referral specifically required rulings on dispositive motions. Finally, the court denied the tenant's request to supplement the record with medical documents, explaining that Rule 60(b)(2) requires newly discovered evidence to have existed at the time of judgment, which these documents did not.
The decision affirms the dismissal of the tenant's federal housing claim, leaving the eviction in place. It reinforces the principle that injunctive relief becomes moot once the underlying action (eviction) is completed. The ruling also clarifies procedural requirements for in forma pauperis litigants, specifically that arguments must be raised in opening briefs and that post-judgment evidence cannot be used to supplement the appellate record under Rule 60(b)(2). The case is remanded with instructions to dismiss the appeal as moot regarding the restraining order and to affirm the dismissal of the substantive claims.
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