Police were executing an arrest warrant for Jesus Coronado, a felon, after his ex-girlfriend reported he had threatened her with a gun. Officers located Coronado's truck at a multi-residential complex and began surveillance. Two days later, they spotted a man matching Coronado's description fleeing into a small, standalone housing unit. After surrounding the unit and ordering occupants out, officers received a call that Coronado might be hiding behind the building. While one officer drafted a search warrant, another climbed a fence behind the unit and spotted a handgun on the roof. The unit's lessee, who was detained, gave officers permission to 'go in' the unit to look for Coronado, but officers waited for a warrant before entering. They later arrested Coronado in a nearby yard and retrieved the gun from the roof. Coronado was charged with felon in possession of a firearm and moved to suppress the gun, arguing the search exceeded the scope of the lessee's consent. The district court denied the motion, and Coronado was convicted and sentenced to 120 months in prison.
The court applied a clear error standard of review to the district court's factual findings regarding the scope of consent. The central legal issue was whether the lessee's consent to 'go in' the unit to find Coronado extended to the roof. The court utilized an objective-reasonableness test, asking what a typical reasonable person would understand the scope of consent to be under the circumstances. The court relied on its precedent in United States v. Pena, which held that general consent to 'look in' a premises authorizes a full search. The court noted three factors supporting the district court's finding: first, the language used by the lessee ('go in') was similar to language previously interpreted as authorizing a full search; second, the lessee never objected to the search or placed limitations on the scope; and third, the object of the search was a person, and a reasonable person would understand that a suspect could hide on a roof. The court distinguished cases where consent was limited to a 'quick look' or where the search area could not physically accommodate a person. Because the roof was large enough to accommodate a person and the lessee gave general consent without limitation, the court found the district court did not clearly err in concluding the search was within the scope of consent. Consequently, the officer was lawfully in a position to view the gun, and its incriminating nature was immediately apparent, satisfying the plain-view doctrine. The court also addressed Coronado's argument that consent ended upon his arrest, but dismissed it as waived because it was not raised in the district court suppression motion.
The decision affirms Coronado's conviction and sentence, leaving the firearm evidence admissible. It clarifies that general consent to search a dwelling for a suspect extends to all areas where that suspect could reasonably be hiding, including elevated or exterior surfaces like roofs, provided the consenter does not explicitly limit the scope. The ruling reinforces that failure to object or limit consent during a search can be interpreted as implied consent to a thorough search of the premises.
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