Robert Smith was stopped by Kentucky State Police in February 2024 when a trooper found fentanyl in a vehicle he was driving. The driver and passenger, who had purchased the drugs from Smith at his home three days earlier, agreed to speak with the trooper. They provided detailed descriptions of Smith's drug-dealing operations, including the types of drugs sold, the location of the transactions, and the specific layout of Smith's property, including a wooden house on Mill Creek Road with a concrete porch and a yard containing a trailer and multiple vehicles. Based on this information, a state judge issued a search warrant for Smith's residence. The search uncovered fentanyl, methamphetamine, hydrocodone, a digital scale, cash, and twelve guns. Smith was subsequently charged with federal gun and drug offenses. He moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the warrant lacked probable cause, but the district court denied the motion without a hearing. Smith then entered a guilty plea to possession of fentanyl with intent to distribute and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense, preserving only the issue of whether the warrant was supported by probable cause or if the good faith exception applied.
The Sixth Circuit reviewed the denial of the motion to suppress de novo, applying the standard that probable cause exists when there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. The court emphasized that when an affidavit relies on informant information, the court must assess the informant's veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge. Here, the court found the affidavit sufficient because two informants provided first-hand, eyewitness accounts of purchasing drugs from Smith at his home within the last three days. The court noted that these accounts were highly credible for three reasons: first, the informants were known to the police, which carries greater weight than anonymous tips because lying to police exposes them to criminal liability; second, the informants made statements against their own penal interest by admitting to purchasing drugs and participating in a drug run, making them potential accomplices; and third, the information was detailed and specific, including descriptions of the house, vehicles, and drug quantities. The court rejected Smith's argument that the informants needed to be named, citing precedent that no such requirement exists. It also rejected the claim that further corroboration was necessary, noting that the trooper's discovery of fentanyl in the informants' car provided partial corroboration and that the detailed nature of the accounts provided sufficient indicia of reliability. Finally, the court distinguished this case from United States v. Higgins, where an affidavit failed because the informant had never seen drugs in the defendant's apartment, whereas here the informants had direct knowledge of drug activity at the specific location.
The decision affirms the district court's judgment, meaning the evidence obtained from the search of Smith's home remains admissible, and Smith's conviction and sentence of 120 months in prison followed by four years of supervised release stand. The ruling reinforces that detailed, first-hand informant testimony from known individuals who admit to criminal activity can establish probable cause without the need for the informants' names to be disclosed in the affidavit. It also clarifies that a defendant may waive the right to appeal a denial of a Franks hearing if that specific issue is not preserved in their plea agreement.
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