Jeremy Marr died in April 2020 following an encounter with Glasgow Police Department officers. After an elderly woman reported a break-in, Officer Turcotte found Marr exiting the home in a distressed state, exhibiting symptoms of methamphetamine intoxication. Marr claimed to have a knife and resisted when officers attempted to handcuff him. Officers Murrell and Phillips arrived to assist, and a struggle ensued where Marr thrashed, refused to place his hands behind his back, and continued to move despite commands. During the approximately four-minute struggle, Officer Turcotte tased Marr between eight and eleven times, and Officer Phillips delivered multiple knee strikes. Marr was subdued, but he died from agitated delirium complicating acute methamphetamine intoxication. The estate of Jeremy Marr sued the officers and the City for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment and various state-law claims. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, ruling that the officers were protected by qualified immunity and that the City could not be held liable for derivative claims.
The Sixth Circuit analyzed the case through the lens of qualified immunity, which protects government officials unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights. The court applied the two-prong test: whether the officer violated a constitutional right and whether that right was clearly established. The court noted that while the first prong was not free from doubt, it was unnecessary to resolve because the officers were entitled to immunity on the second prong. The court emphasized that the right to be free from excessive force is not sufficiently specific at a high level of generality; instead, the law must 'squarely govern' the specific facts. The court found that the officers were entitled to use force because Marr was actively resisting arrest. Under Sixth Circuit precedent, active resistance includes physically struggling, thrashing, and refusing to comply with commands to handcuff. The court cited cases holding that officers may use tasers and knee strikes against suspects who are actively resisting, even if they are intoxicated or suffering from diminished capacity. The court rejected the argument that the number of taser discharges was excessive, noting that prior cases have granted immunity for similar or greater numbers of discharges against resisting suspects. Furthermore, the court held that the City could not be liable for negligent hiring or supervision because municipal liability requires a showing of deliberate indifference, which cannot exist if the underlying constitutional right was not clearly established. Finally, the court dismissed the state-law claims, noting that Plaintiffs waived arguments against individual officers and that vicarious liability and negligent supervision claims fail without a primary tortious act by the employees.
The decision reinforces the high bar for overcoming qualified immunity in excessive force cases involving active resistance, even when the suspect is intoxicated or the force appears severe. It clarifies that municipalities cannot be held liable for training failures if the specific constitutional violation was not clearly established at the time. The ruling leaves open the question of whether the force would have been reasonable under a direct Fourth Amendment analysis, but shields officers from civil liability as long as the law was not clearly established. The case is remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the defendants, effectively ending the civil litigation.
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