Background
Gabriel Mejia Perez, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States without admission in January two thousand nine. He owns a construction business and has three United States citizen children. In October two thousand eighteen, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings. Mejia Perez sought cancellation of removal under Section twelve two nine b of the Immigration and Nationality Act, arguing that his removal would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his children. The Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals denied his application, finding that the hardship was not exceptional or extremely unusual.
The court’s reasoning
The court reviewed the agency’s conclusion for substantial evidence, deferring to the agency’s factual findings unless no reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude otherwise. The court found that the petitioner did not meet the high bar for exceptional and extremely unusual hardship, which requires hardship significantly different from or greater than that normally expected from deportation. The agency considered all factors in the aggregate, including the children’s continued residence with their mother, their good health, their ability to continue schooling, and the petitioner’s capacity to maintain financial support and a relationship with them from Mexico. The court concluded that while removal would cause hardship, it did not rise to the level required by law.
Here no reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude that Mejia Perez’s removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his three United States citizen children.
Mejia Perez v. Blanche, No. 25-3807 (6th Cir. July 14, 2026)
What it means going forward
The decision reinforces the high evidentiary burden required to prove exceptional and extremely unusual hardship in cancellation of removal cases and confirms that agencies must consider hardship factors in the aggregate.