6th Cir.

Spicer v. Harvard Maintenance, Inc.

May 1, 2026 ·25-1667 ·Published ·Davis · By Aisha Johnson

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment against Oneka Spicer on her state-law employment discrimination claims. The court held that Spicer failed to present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or to prove that her employer's reasons for termination were pretextual.

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Oneka Spicer, a woman of African American descent, worked as a cleaner for Harvard Maintenance, Inc. in Michigan between 2017 and 2018. Her employment was governed by a Collective Bargaining Agreement and company work rules. During her tenure, Spicer received multiple written reprimands for substandard cleaning work and policy violations, including sitting in a client's chair and charging her phone during a shift. After a grievance meeting where she admitted to violating company policy, Harvard terminated her employment. Spicer sued under Michigan's Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, alleging race discrimination, sex discrimination, and a hostile work environment. The district court granted summary judgment to Harvard, ruling that Spicer failed to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding her claims. Spicer appealed, also challenging the denial of her motion to reconsider the summary judgment order.

The Sixth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. The court first addressed whether Spicer established a prima facie case of discrimination. Regarding the 'qualified' element, the court clarified that a plaintiff must show objective qualifications independent of the employer's proffered reasons for discharge. Spicer failed to provide any evidence of her objective skills or qualifications, forfeiting arguments she raised for the first time on appeal. On the fourth element, Spicer needed to show circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. Her comparator evidence failed because the proposed comparator, Robert Hood, committed minor performance violations, whereas Spicer committed major violations of company policy, making them not similarly situated in all relevant respects. Her statistical evidence also failed because the percentage of Black employees terminated (94%) was nearly identical to the percentage of Black employees in the workforce (93%), eliminating any inference of disparate treatment. Regarding the hostile work environment claim, the court found Spicer's evidence insufficient. A single comment about sitting in a chair was not severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of employment, and Spicer could not prove the comment was motivated by racial animus. Finally, the court affirmed the denial of the motion to reconsider, noting that the district court had thoroughly addressed the same issues.

The decision affirms the dismissal of Spicer's discrimination claims, leaving the lower court's judgment in place. It reinforces the Sixth Circuit's requirement that plaintiffs must present objective evidence of qualifications separate from the employer's reasons for termination. The ruling also clarifies that statistical evidence must show a significant disparity between the workforce composition and termination rates to support an inference of discrimination, and that comparators must have engaged in conduct of comparable seriousness to be valid.

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