Barbara Jean Mercer was convicted of second-degree murder, tampering with evidence, and third-degree arson after two drug dealers, Anthony Hannah and Shemel Thomas, were found shot and burned in a car. The victims had been threatening Mercer and her boyfriend, Ricky Janish, over unpaid drug debts. Janish shot both men; he claimed he acted to scare them and to defend Mercer when Thomas allegedly tried to assault her. At trial, Mercer's defense argued that Janish acted in self-defense and that Mercer did not have the intent to kill. The trial court denied a defense-of-others jury instruction for Mercer regarding Thomas's death, though it provided a self-defense instruction for Hannah. After the state courts affirmed her conviction, Mercer filed a federal habeas petition. The district court granted relief on the jury-instruction claim, finding a due process violation, but denied relief on other claims. The Sixth Circuit now reviews the case on cross-appeal.
The Sixth Circuit began by clarifying the standard of review under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The court determined that the question of whether a jury instruction should be given based on the evidence is a mixed question of law and fact, which falls under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). This requires the federal court to determine if the state court's decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The court noted that the Supreme Court has never clearly established a constitutional right to a self-defense or defense-of-others jury instruction. Citing Keahey v. Marquis, the Sixth Circuit held that because no such right exists in clearly established precedent, a state court's refusal to give such an instruction cannot constitute an unreasonable application of federal law. The court rejected the district court's approach of treating the issue as a factual determination under § 2254(d)(2), emphasizing that AEDPA requires deference to state court decisions on mixed questions. Regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the court found that while trial counsel initially mistakenly suggested a duress defense was available, the error did not prejudice Mercer. The prosecutor and judge corrected the error during the trial, and the state court reasonably determined that the jury followed the corrected instructions. Finally, on the prosecutorial misconduct claim, the court found that the prosecutor's incorrect comments about hearsay were isolated and did not infect the trial with unfairness. The trial judge issued curative instructions, and the Supreme Court precedent in Darden v. Wainwright supports the conclusion that the trial remained fundamentally fair despite the prosecutor's remarks.
The decision reinstates Barbara Mercer's murder convictions and denies her federal habeas relief. It reinforces the Sixth Circuit's precedent that federal courts cannot grant habeas relief based on the denial of a self-defense or defense-of-others jury instruction, as no such constitutional right is clearly established. The ruling limits the ability of state prisoners to challenge jury instructions on these grounds under AEDPA, requiring them to meet the high bar of showing an error well beyond fairminded disagreement. The case is remanded to the district court to close the proceedings, as the grant of habeas relief is reversed.
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