7th Cir.

WILLIAM CLYDE GIBSON III v. RON NEAL

February 12, 2026 ·25-2779 ·Panel Decision ·Scudder · By Aisha Johnson

The Seventh Circuit reversed a district court order transporting a death row inmate for mental health testing, holding that the All Writs Act does not authorize such measures without a sufficient nexus to a specific claim for relief. The court found the petitioner failed to demonstrate how the requested brain scans would be admissible evidence to support his equitable tolling argument.

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William Clyde Gibson III, a death row inmate in Indiana, filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 more than two years after the statutory deadline. The State moved to dismiss the petition as untimely. Gibson argued he was entitled to equitable tolling due to attorney abandonment, the COVID-19 pandemic, and his own untreated mental health conditions. To support this claim, Gibson requested an evidentiary hearing and sought a court order under the All Writs Act to transport him to a hospital for MRI and PET brain scans. The district court granted the transportation order, reasoning the scans would help develop evidence regarding his mental state and the impact of prior counsel's conduct. The State appealed, arguing the order was an abuse of discretion.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed its jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine, noting that transportation orders are immediately appealable. The court then applied the standard set forth in Shoop v. Twyford, which holds that the All Writs Act does not authorize a transportation order to search for new evidence unless the petitioner shows the evidence would be admissible in connection with a particular claim for relief. The court found that Gibson failed to establish the required nexus. While Gibson argued the scans would show his mental impairments left him unable to manage his affairs, he did not articulate how the specific etiology of his brain abnormalities would prove attorney abandonment or incompetence in the context of equitable tolling. The court emphasized that the All Writs Act cannot be used to allow a prisoner to 'fish for unusable evidence.' Because Gibson could not link the brain scans to a specific claim or the equitable tolling inquiry with the particularity demanded by Twyford, the district court abused its discretion in granting the order.

The district court's order transporting Gibson for mental health testing is vacated. The case is remanded for the district court to proceed with the evidentiary hearing on the equitable tolling claim, but the court must do so without relying on the transportation order or the brain scans. The decision clarifies that while mental health evidence may be relevant to equitable tolling, the All Writs Act cannot be used to obtain evidence that lacks a demonstrated link to admissibility under AEDPA's strict evidentiary rules.

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