7th Cir.

JORDAN TALLEY-SMITH v. MISSION LANE, LLC

February 24, 2026 ·25-2689 ·Panel Decision · By Maria Santos

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Jordan Talley-Smith's lawsuit against Mission Lane, LLC, ruling that he cannot represent a private trust pro se and failed to comply with signature requirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The court held that Smith's claims were frivolous because they relied on the invalid legal theory that a self-created bill of exchange satisfied his debt obligations.

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Jordan Talley-Smith sued Mission Lane, LLC, in federal court after the lender refused to accept a document Smith called a 'bill of exchange' as payment for his credit card debt. Smith had previously sent multiple notices demanding the lender apply his account balance to his account number in 'Accord and Satisfaction.' When the lender ignored these documents and reported the account as delinquent, Smith filed suit in state court, which was removed to federal court. Smith attempted to litigate the case pro se, filing twenty motions and multiple amended complaints. He signed these documents with typed names and identified himself as a 'Trustee' for a private trust. The district court struck his filings for violating Rule 11 and local rules regarding signatures and party identification, and warned Smith that a trust could only be represented by an attorney. Smith filed a second amended complaint but continued to sign it as a trustee and maintain the same frivolous debt-satisfaction theory. The district court dismissed the case with prejudice, concluding that Smith had not stated a valid claim under the Truth in Lending Act or other statutes because his notices did not properly identify billing errors.

The Seventh Circuit addressed three primary issues. First, the court rejected Smith's argument that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a)(1)(E) allows a pro se litigant to represent a trust. The court clarified that this rule merely designates the proper party when a trustee sues on behalf of a trust; it does not authorize an unrepresented individual to act as counsel for a trust. Citing Georgakis v. Ill. State Univ., the court reaffirmed that a pro se litigant can only represent themselves, not a private trust. Second, the court upheld the district court's application of Rule 11(a) and local rules requiring original signatures. The court noted that while federal rules generally require personal signatures, local rules for the Northern District of Indiana explicitly require manual signatures for manually filed documents, excluding typed or stamped signatures. Since Smith failed to resubmit his filings with original signatures, the court found no abuse of discretion in striking them. Third, on the merits, the court analyzed Smith's claims under the Fair Credit Billing Act. The Act requires a consumer to send a notice that identifies the debtor, indicates a belief of a billing error, specifies the amount, and explains the reason for that belief. The court found that Smith's 'bill of exchange' and subsequent notices did not meet these requirements because they were framed as payment demands rather than billing error notices. The court concluded that Smith's underlying theory—that a bill of exchange satisfies a debt—is frivolous, making further amendment futile.

The decision affirms the dismissal of Smith's case with prejudice, meaning he cannot refile the same claims. It reinforces the strict requirement that private trusts must be represented by licensed attorneys in federal court and that unrepresented parties must manually sign their filings in the Northern District of Indiana. The ruling clarifies that self-created financial instruments like 'bills of exchange' do not constitute valid payment of debts and that notices must strictly comply with the Fair Credit Billing Act's procedural requirements to trigger creditor obligations.

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