Markus Evans, a Wisconsin prisoner, sued several officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The dispute arose after Evans assisted an inmate having a seizure, leading to accusations of assault. Evans claimed that Lieutenant Michael Cole directed an officer to lie in the conduct report and that Lieutenant John Lannoye told him he would be found guilty before the hearing. Lieutenant Anthony Matushak, who presided over the disciplinary hearing, emailed a security director requesting permission to impose 300 days of segregation and later told Evans he was 'probably going to get' segregation. Matushak found Evans guilty and imposed the sanction. Evans also faced indefinite administrative confinement following an investigation by Cole. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that Evans failed to plausibly allege a protected liberty interest because his description of confinement conditions was too conclusory.
The Seventh Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo, accepting Evans's factual allegations as true. First, regarding the liberty interest, the court clarified that while 'harsh' conditions alone might be insufficient, an allegation of segregation lasting six months to a year requires scrutiny of the actual conditions. Because the district court dismissed the claim without a factual record, the appellate court found the dismissal premature. The court held that an allegation of 300 days in disciplinary segregation is sufficient to state a claim for a protected liberty interest. Second, the court addressed the impartiality of the hearing officer. Due process forbids a hearing officer from predetermining the outcome of a disciplinary hearing. The court found that Matushak's email requesting permission for a specific sanction nine days prior to the hearing, combined with his post-verdict comment referencing a prior conversation about a guaranteed guilty finding, made it plausible that he prejudged Evans's guilt. Third, the court addressed the claim against Cole regarding administrative confinement. The court noted that while discretionary administrative segregation is usually ordinary prison life, lengthy indefinite confinement may implicate a liberty interest. The district court had not addressed whether Evans's over one-year confinement constituted a deprivation of liberty or whether Cole's dual role as investigator and hearing officer violated due process. The court instructed the district court to consider these issues on remand.
The case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings. The lower court must now determine if Evans's indefinite administrative confinement constitutes a deprivation of a protected liberty interest and whether Cole's involvement in both the investigation and the hearing violated due process. The decision clarifies that lengthy disciplinary segregation allegations alone can survive a motion to dismiss, and it reinforces that pre-determination of guilt by a hearing officer is a viable due process claim.
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