Marion Thomas sued police officers Daniel McAuliffe and Michael Botica, along with the City of Chicago, under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 following his arrest and a subsequent search of his vehicle. The incident began on November 19, 2019, when officers observed Thomas failing to signal a left turn. Upon stopping the vehicle, officers detected the smell of marijuana and ordered Thomas to roll down his window further, put the car in park, and exit the vehicle. Thomas complied only after repeated requests and eventually refused to exit, leading officers to physically remove him from the car. During the arrest, Thomas allegedly went limp and screamed, claiming he was having a seizure. Officers found a marijuana roach and a tray in the vehicle. Thomas filed suit alleging illegal search, illegal seizure, false arrest, and malicious prosecution. After a jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants, Thomas moved for a new trial, arguing that jury instructions were legally flawed and that an officer's testimony regarding a 'grinder' was fraudulent.
The Seventh Circuit, writing through Circuit Judge Ripple, addressed three primary grounds for Thomas's motion for a new trial. First, regarding the jury instructions, the court applied the 'any crime' rule established in Devenpeck v. Alford. This rule dictates that a false arrest claim is defeated if there was probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for any crime, not merely the crime for which the arrest was initially made. The court found the 'Issues' instruction correct because the officers had probable cause for both the traffic violation and the marijuana offense based on the smell of cannabis at the time of the arrest. Second, the court analyzed the 'Authorized Acts' instruction. Thomas argued it failed to define 'resisting' as requiring physical action under Illinois law. The court held that the instruction, read as a whole, correctly informed the jury that a motorist must comply with commands if there is reasonable suspicion. The court noted that while 'resisting' requires physical action and 'obstructing' can be passive, the instruction sufficiently communicated the obligation to comply, and the district court had substantial discretion in its wording. Third, the court addressed the claim of fraud regarding Officer Morales's testimony. Morales had testified at trial that he found a 'grinder,' whereas in his deposition he recalled hearing the word 'cutter' in body-worn camera footage. The court found this was a disagreement over colloquial terms for marijuana tools rather than fraud or willful misconduct. The record showed the jury was informed of the inconsistency via a stipulation and cross-examination, negating any prejudice. Finally, the court noted that defense counsel's question about Thomas's criminal record was immediately objected to and sustained, and the jury was instructed that such questions are not evidence, thus preventing any reversible prejudice.
The decision reinforces the 'any crime' rule in the Seventh Circuit, allowing officers to justify arrests based on probable cause for any offense discovered during the encounter, even if not the initial basis for the stop. It also clarifies that jury instructions need not explicitly define every term of art if the overall instruction correctly states the law. The ruling limits the availability of new trials based on minor inconsistencies in witness testimony unless clear evidence of fraud or willful misconduct is present. The judgment is affirmed, leaving the jury verdict for the officers intact.