Mohamed Ibrahim Hassan, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was placed in removal proceedings by the Department of Homeland Security. DHS charged Hassan with removability based on a 2019 guilty plea to attempting to receive stolen property under Section 514.110 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, any noncitizen convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable. The federal definition of 'aggravated felony' includes a theft offense, such as receipt of stolen property, but requires that the defendant acted with subjective knowledge or belief that the property was stolen. Hassan argued that his state conviction did not match this federal definition because the Kentucky statute might allow for conviction based on a lower mental state standard. An immigration judge initially agreed with Hassan and terminated the proceedings, but the Board of Immigration Appeals reversed that decision. Hassan then petitioned the Seventh Circuit for review.
The Seventh Circuit applied the categorical approach, which requires courts to look only at the statutory definition of the crime of conviction rather than the specific facts of the case. The court noted that for a state conviction to count as a federal aggravated felony for receipt of stolen property, the state statute must require the same mental state as federal law: subjective knowledge or belief that the property was stolen. The court examined Kentucky Revised Statutes Section 514.110, which criminalizes receiving property 'knowing that it has been stolen, or having reason to believe that it has been stolen.' The court found that federal precedent suggests 'reason to believe' is an objective standard that is insufficient for the federal aggravated felony definition. However, the court could not determine how Kentucky courts interpret 'reason to believe' within their own statute. The court analyzed two key Kentucky Supreme Court cases. In Commonwealth v. Griffin, the court suggested that 'reason to believe' could be satisfied by constructive knowledge, meaning what a reasonable person would have known. Conversely, in Martin v. Commonwealth, the court described Griffin as addressing 'deliberate ignorance' or 'willful blindness,' which is treated as actual knowledge in federal law. Because these cases offer conflicting guidance on whether the Kentucky standard is purely objective or requires a form of subjective awareness, the Seventh Circuit could not definitively conclude whether the statute is overbroad. The court emphasized that it is hesitant to interpret Kentucky law when the state's highest court has not provided a clear answer.
The case is paused while the Seventh Circuit awaits an answer from the Kentucky Supreme Court. The outcome will determine whether Hassan's conviction categorically matches the federal definition of an aggravated felony. If the Kentucky Supreme Court rules that Section 514.110 allows for conviction based solely on an objective 'reason to believe' standard without subjective knowledge, Hassan's conviction will likely be deemed an aggravated felony, making him deportable. If the court rules that the statute requires subjective knowledge, the conviction will not qualify as an aggravated felony, and Hassan may avoid removal on this ground. The Seventh Circuit's certification leaves the legal status of similar Kentucky convictions unresolved until the state court provides guidance.