7th Cir.

MICHAEL J. CONNOR v. BRITTANY GREENE

March 3, 2026 ·23-1595 ·Panel Decision ·SYKES · By James Taylor

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief, holding that the state court's finding that the petitioner would not have accepted a plea offer was not objectively unreasonable. The court ruled that the petitioner's steadfast claim of innocence throughout the proceedings rebutted his later testimony that he would have pleaded guilty if informed of the mandatory life sentence.

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Michael Connor was convicted in 2013 of five counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child in Illinois. The statute mandated a life sentence if convicted of assaulting more than one child, though the charging documents listed a range of six to 60 years per count. At the plea-bargaining stage, Connor's attorney allegedly failed to inform him of the mandatory life sentence, leading Connor to reject an 18-year plea offer based on the belief he faced a maximum of 30 years. After a bench trial, Connor was sentenced to the mandatory life term. During his allocution at sentencing, Connor professed his innocence and stated unequivocally that he would not have pleaded guilty to get a lesser sentence even if he had known the outcome of the trial. In subsequent state post-conviction proceedings, Connor claimed his counsel was ineffective for not warning him of the life sentence, testifying that he would have accepted the plea deal had he known the true penalty. The state trial judge found Connor's post-conviction testimony incredible because it contradicted his prior statements of innocence and his declaration at sentencing.

The Seventh Circuit applied the highly deferential standards of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), state court factual findings are presumed correct and can only be overturned by clear and convincing evidence. The court emphasized that credibility determinations are entitled to particularly great deference. The state trial judge found Connor's post-conviction testimony unbelievable because it flatly contradicted his unambiguous statements made earlier in the case, specifically his declaration at sentencing that he would not plead guilty even to avoid a life sentence. The court held that the significant disparity between the 18-year plea offer and the mandatory life sentence was not enough on its own to rebut the state court's adverse credibility finding. To prove prejudice under Strickland and Frye, Connor needed to show a reasonable probability that he would have pleaded guilty, but his own prior conduct and statements undermined this claim. The court concluded that Connor failed to clearly and convincingly rebut the presumption that the state court's finding that he would not have accepted the plea offer was correct.

The decision affirms Connor's conviction and mandatory life sentence. It reinforces the high bar for federal habeas petitioners challenging state court credibility findings, particularly when the petitioner's own prior statements contradict their current claims of prejudice. The ruling clarifies that a sentence disparity alone does not satisfy the burden of proof for ineffective assistance of counsel in plea-bargaining contexts when the defendant has previously asserted innocence and refusal to plead guilty.

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