2nd Cir.

Moreira v. Société Générale, S.A.

January 7, 2025 ·23-568 ·Panel Decision ·SACK · By Maria Santos

The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Helms-Burton Act claims, holding that the statute's two-year time bar is a statute of repose that cannot be tolled by presidential suspensions. Consequently, claims based on conduct occurring more than two years before filing were barred, and remaining allegations failed to plausibly allege trafficking.

Listen to this decision 0:00 / 4:14

Plaintiffs, successors-in-interest to assets of two Cuban banks seized by the Castro regime in 1960, sued French banks Société Générale and BNP Paribas under the Helms-Burton Act. The Act allows U.S. nationals to sue persons who traffic in property confiscated by Cuba. The plaintiffs alleged the banks trafficked in the seized assets by providing financing and currency to Cuba's national bank. However, the private right of action under the Act was suspended by every President from 1996 until May 2019. When the plaintiffs finally filed suit in 2019 and 2020, the banks moved to dismiss, arguing that most of the alleged conduct occurred more than two years prior to filing and was therefore time-barred. The district courts agreed, dismissing the claims as untimely and, for some allegations, failing to state a plausible claim.

The court addressed four main issues. First, it confirmed the plaintiffs had Article III standing because the alleged trafficking caused a concrete financial injury similar to the common-law tort of unjust enrichment. Second, the court analyzed whether the two-year time bar in 22 U.S.C. § 6084 was a statute of limitations or a statute of repose. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in ANZ Securities, the Second Circuit held that § 6084 is a statute of repose because it runs from the defendant's last culpable act and admits of no exception. This means the right to be free from liability is extinguished two years after the trafficking ceases, regardless of when the plaintiff discovers the injury. Third, the court rejected the argument that presidential suspensions of the right to sue tolled the statute of repose. The court reasoned that while the President could suspend the plaintiff's right to bring an action, the statute of repose protects the defendant's right to be free from liability after a fixed period, and the Act contains no provision extending that period during suspensions. Finally, the court examined the remaining allegations of conduct after 2010. The court found these claims insufficient because they relied on 'information and belief' without specific facts. The plaintiffs failed to allege that the banks continued to transact with the specific Cuban bank holding the confiscated assets, or that the cash deliveries alleged constituted trafficking in confiscated property itself.

This decision effectively bars most Helms-Burton claims against foreign banks for historical trafficking in confiscated Cuban property, as the two-year repose period will likely have expired for most alleged conduct. It clarifies that the long history of presidential suspensions does not extend the deadline for filing suit. Future plaintiffs must allege specific facts showing trafficking that occurred within two years of filing, rather than relying on general allegations of ongoing business with Cuba.

Play