2nd Cir.

Moreira et al. v. Société Générale et al.

January 7, 2025 ·23-394 ·Panel Decision ·SACK · By Maria Santos

The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Helms-Burton Act claims, holding that the statute's two-year time bar is a statute of repose that runs from the defendant's last culpable act. Because the plaintiffs' allegations of trafficking predated their complaints by more than two years and the presidential suspensions of the right to sue did not toll the repose period, the claims were time-barred.

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Plaintiffs, successors-in-interest to assets of two Cuban banks seized by the Castro regime in 1960, sued French banks Société Générale and BNP Paribas under the Helms-Burton Act. The Act allows U.S. nationals to sue persons who traffic in property confiscated by the Cuban government. The plaintiffs alleged the banks trafficked in the confiscated assets by providing financing and credit to the Cuban National Bank (BNC) from 2000 through 2010, and continued similar conduct into 2018 and 2020. However, the private right of action under the Act was suspended by every President from 1996 until May 2019. The plaintiffs filed suit in 2019 and 2020. The district courts dismissed the cases, ruling that most allegations were time-barred because the two-year statute of repose had expired, and that the remaining allegations failed to state a plausible claim of trafficking.

The court addressed four main issues. First, it confirmed the plaintiffs had Article III standing because the alleged unjust enrichment from the banks' use of confiscated property constitutes a concrete, particularized injury. Second, the court analyzed whether the two-year time bar in 22 U.S.C. § 6084 is a statute of limitations or a statute of repose. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in ANZ Securities, the court found the text 'may not be brought more than 2 years after the trafficking… has ceased to occur' indicates a statute of repose. This means the clock starts when the defendant's last culpable act occurs, not when the plaintiff discovers the injury, and it extinguishes the cause of action after the fixed period. Third, the court rejected the argument that presidential suspensions of the right to sue tolled the statute of repose. The court reasoned that while the President could suspend the right to bring an action, the statute of repose protects the defendant's right to be free from liability after a fixed period, and the Act contained no legislative exception to toll the repose period for suspensions. Finally, the court found the remaining allegations of conduct within the two-year window failed to state a claim. The plaintiffs relied on 'information and belief' to allege the banks continued trafficking with the Cuban National Bank after 2010, but provided no specific facts to support these conclusory assertions. The allegation that the bank delivered parcels of U.S. currency to BNC was also insufficient because the plaintiffs did not allege the cash itself was confiscated property or that the bank benefited from trafficking in such property.

The decision bars Helms-Burton claims against foreign banks for trafficking in confiscated Cuban property that occurred more than two years before the lawsuit was filed, regardless of presidential suspensions of the right to sue. It limits the scope of the Act by requiring plaintiffs to plead specific, non-conclusory facts regarding recent trafficking activities involving the specific confiscated assets, rather than relying on general allegations of ongoing business with Cuban entities. The judgments dismissing the cases are affirmed, leaving the plaintiffs without a remedy for the alleged past trafficking.

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