Charles Anthony Giovinco pleaded guilty in 2008 to enticement of a minor and possession of child pornography. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of 235 months for the enticement count and 120 months for the child pornography count. In 2018, Congress passed the First Step Act, which allows eligible prisoners to earn time credits for participating in recidivism reduction programs. However, the Act bars prisoners from earning these credits if they are serving a sentence for specific enumerated offenses, including possession of child pornography. Giovinco argued that once he completed serving the 120-month sentence for the child pornography count, he was no longer serving a sentence for an ineligible offense and should be eligible for credits on the remaining time attributable to the enticement count. The Bureau of Prisons denied his request, maintaining that his entire aggregate term remained ineligible. The district court agreed with the Bureau and denied Giovinco's habeas petition, leading to this appeal.
The court analyzed the interaction between the First Step Act's eligibility criteria and 18 U.S.C. § 3584(c), which mandates that multiple terms of imprisonment be treated as a single aggregate term for administrative purposes. Giovinco argued that the phrase 'serving a sentence for' in the First Step Act referred only to the individual sentence for the ineligible count. The court rejected this, noting that the First Step Act does not explicitly depart from the background principle of aggregation established in § 3584(c). The court emphasized that the Bureau of Prisons is charged with administering the time credit program, and this administration constitutes an 'administrative purpose' under § 3584(c). Consequently, the phrase 'serving a sentence for' must be understood in the context of the aggregated term. The court distinguished this from judicial resentencing, clarifying that while courts cannot aggregate sentences for resentencing purposes, the Bureau's implementation of statutory credit programs is an administrative function subject to aggregation. The court affirmed that the statutory scheme requires the Bureau to aggregate sentences when determining eligibility, meaning the presence of any ineligible offense bars credits for the entire aggregate term.
Prisoners with mixed eligible and ineligible concurrent sentences cannot earn First Step Act time credits for the portion of their term attributable to eligible offenses. The decision aligns the Second Circuit with other circuits that have applied sentence aggregation to the First Step Act. The judgment affirming the district court's denial of relief is upheld, and no remand instructions were issued as the case was decided on the merits of the statutory interpretation.
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