Do No Harm, a nationwide membership organization, sued Pfizer alleging that the company's Breakthrough Fellowship Program unlawfully excluded white and Asian-American applicants in violation of federal and state civil rights laws. The program was designed to increase minority representation in Pfizer's workforce. Do No Harm sought a preliminary injunction to stop the selection of the 2023 class while asserting that two of its members, identified only by pseudonyms, were ready and able to apply but were barred by the program's racial criteria. The district court denied the injunction and dismissed the case without prejudice, ruling that Do No Harm lacked Article III standing because it failed to identify any injured member by name. The organization appealed, arguing that the naming requirement should not apply at the pleading stage and that the case should have been allowed to proceed despite the lack of a preliminary injunction.
The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal based on two primary legal conclusions regarding Article III standing. First, the court addressed the standard for associational standing when a preliminary injunction is sought. Citing Cacchillo v. Insmed, Inc., the court held that the burden to demonstrate standing at the preliminary injunction stage is no less than that required for summary judgment. Under this standard, an association relying on injuries to its members must identify at least one injured member by name. The court reasoned that while an organization may seek to protect member identities from public disclosure, it cannot remain anonymous to the court itself. The requirement to name a member ensures that the injury is concrete and particularized, rather than conjectural, and prevents organizations from litigating hypothetical claims. The court found that Do No Harm failed to meet this burden because it relied on declarations from members identified only as 'Member A' and 'Member B' without disclosing their real names to the court. Second, the court addressed the procedural consequence of failing to establish standing during a preliminary injunction motion. Rejecting the argument that the case should have been allowed to proceed on the less rigorous pleading-stage standard, the court held that once a court determines it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the complaint in its entirety. The court distinguished the Second Circuit's approach from that of the D.C. Circuit, emphasizing that a determination of no standing at the summary judgment standard is a final conclusion on jurisdiction, not merely a finding that the plaintiff failed to show a likelihood of success.
The decision requires plaintiff associations seeking preliminary injunctions to disclose the real names of at least one injured member to the court, even if they wish to keep those names confidential from the public. It clarifies that a failure to establish standing at the preliminary injunction stage results in a dismissal of the entire case without prejudice, rather than a denial of the injunction with the case left open for further proceedings. This ruling limits the ability of organizations to litigate discrimination claims on behalf of members who wish to remain completely anonymous to the judicial system.
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