This case arises from multidistrict litigation filed by victims of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the Republic of Sudan. Plaintiffs alleged that Sudan provided material support to al Qaeda, leading to the attacks. The district court denied Sudan's motion to dismiss, ruling that Sudan lacked sovereign immunity under two exceptions to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: the state-sponsored terrorism exception under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A and the JASTA exception under § 1605B. Sudan filed an interlocutory appeal, seeking immediate review only of the immunity denial under § 1605B and the repealed predecessor statute § 1605(a)(7), while explicitly excluding the § 1605A ruling from its appeal. Sudan argued that the collateral-order doctrine allowed this immediate appeal despite the lack of certification. Plaintiffs moved to dismiss, arguing that § 1605A(f)'s specific appellate bar precluded any interlocutory review in this case.
The Second Circuit analyzed the interplay between the general collateral-order doctrine and the specific statutory bar in 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(f). The court first determined that the district court's order was a nonfinal 'order' within the meaning of the statute because it did not conclusively end the litigation. The court then addressed whether the plaintiffs' actions were 'brought under' § 1605A. The court held that because the operative complaints asserted claims under § 1605A's private right of action, the actions fell within the statute's scope. The court rejected Sudan's argument that the appellate bar only applied to § 1605A claims and not to other exceptions like § 1605B. The court reasoned that § 1605A(f) restricts appeals from the entire 'order,' not just specific issues within it. Furthermore, the court found that the statute's text, which states appeals 'may only be taken' pursuant to § 1292(b) certification, unambiguously eliminates the collateral-order doctrine as a jurisdictional basis for interlocutory appeals in these cases. The court noted that Congress enacted this bar specifically to prevent state sponsors of terrorism from using procedural delays to frustrate victims' suits.
Sudan cannot obtain immediate review of the district court's denial of immunity under § 1605B or § 1605(a)(7). The appeal is dismissed without prejudice, allowing Sudan to seek review only after the district court enters a final judgment on the merits. This decision reinforces the legislative intent to prevent state sponsors of terrorism from delaying litigation through interlocutory appeals. The court did not reach the merits of Sudan's arguments regarding the timeliness of the § 1605A claims or whether § 1605A is a standalone exception, deferring those questions to the final judgment stage.
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