This case arises from multidistrict litigation involving plaintiffs who were harmed in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The plaintiffs, including individuals, families, and insurers, sued the Republic of Sudan, alleging that the state knowingly provided material support to al Qaeda, including harboring Osama Bin Laden and funding terrorist training camps. The district court denied Sudan's motion to dismiss, ruling that Sudan lacked sovereign immunity under two exceptions to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA): the state-sponsored terrorism exception under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A and the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act exception under 28 U.S.C. § 1605B. Sudan filed an interlocutory appeal challenging only the denial of immunity under § 1605B and the predecessor statute § 1605(a)(7), arguing that the collateral-order doctrine allowed immediate review of those specific rulings. However, the underlying litigation also included claims brought directly under § 1605A, which contains a specific statutory bar on interlocutory appeals.
The Second Circuit, writing for the panel, focused on the text of 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(f), which states that in an action brought under § 1605A, appeals from orders not conclusively ending the litigation may only be taken if the district court certifies the order for immediate appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The court rejected Sudan's argument that the bar only applied to appeals specifically targeting § 1605A rulings. The court held that § 1605A(f) restricts review of the entire nonfinal 'order,' not just specific issues within it. Because the plaintiffs' actions were 'brought under' § 1605A—asserting claims under that section's private right of action—the appellate bar applied to the whole order, including the rulings on § 1605B and § 1605(a)(7). The court further concluded that the statutory language 'may only be taken' pursuant to § 1292(b) eliminates the collateral-order doctrine as a jurisdictional basis for interlocutory appeals in these cases. Legislative history supported this reading, showing Congress intended to prevent state sponsors of terrorism from using the collateral-order doctrine to delay justice for victims. The court declined to address Sudan's arguments regarding the timeliness of the § 1605A claims or whether § 1605A is a 'standalone' exception, noting those challenges were premature and would require reviewing the merits of the district court's jurisdictional holding, which is barred by § 1605A(f).
The dismissal means Sudan cannot immediately challenge the denial of immunity on appeal. The denial of sovereign immunity remains in effect, and the district court will proceed to trial or further proceedings on the merits. Sudan may appeal the final judgment once the district court concludes the case, at which point it can challenge the immunity rulings and the timeliness of the § 1605A claims. The decision clarifies that state sponsors of terrorism cannot use procedural doctrines to delay victim compensation suits, reinforcing the statutory goal of § 1605A to provide a remedy for terrorism victims.
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