2nd Cir.

In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001

September 3, 2024 ·23-1294 ·Panel Decision ·John M. Walker, Jr. · By Aisha Johnson

The Second Circuit dismissed the Republic of Sudan's interlocutory appeal, holding that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act's state-sponsored terrorism exception bars foreign states from using the collateral-order doctrine to bypass final judgment requirements. Consequently, Sudan must wait for a final district court judgment before challenging immunity rulings under non-§ 1605A exceptions.

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This case arises from multidistrict litigation involving individuals and insurers harmed by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Plaintiffs filed suits against the Republic of Sudan, alleging that Sudan provided material support to al Qaeda. The complaints asserted claims under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), specifically the state-sponsored terrorism exception at 28 U.S.C. § 1605A, as well as the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act exception at § 1605B and the repealed predecessor statute § 1605(a)(7). The district court denied Sudan's motion to dismiss, ruling that Sudan lacked immunity under both § 1605A and § 1605B. Sudan then filed a notice of appeal seeking immediate review of the immunity denials under § 1605B and § 1605(a)(7), but not § 1605A. Sudan argued that the collateral-order doctrine allowed this immediate appeal despite the lack of a final judgment. Plaintiffs moved to dismiss, arguing that § 1605A(f) barred the appeal entirely.

The Second Circuit analyzed whether the statutory appellate bar in 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(f) overrides the collateral-order doctrine. The court first determined that the district court's order was a nonfinal 'order' because it did not conclusively end the litigation. The court then addressed whether the plaintiffs' actions were 'brought under' § 1605A. The court held that because the operative complaints asserted claims under § 1605A's private right of action, the actions fell within the scope of § 1605A(f), regardless of whether other exceptions like § 1605B were also invoked. The court rejected Sudan's argument that the statute only barred appeals in actions 'brought' under § 1605A and not those 'maintained' under it, noting that the statutory text and legislative history did not support such a distinction. Crucially, the court found that § 1605A(f) explicitly states that appeals from nonfinal orders 'may only be taken' pursuant to § 1292(b) certification. Since the district court did not certify the order, the court held that § 1605A(f) eliminates all interlocutory appeals under the collateral-order doctrine for orders falling within its scope. The court emphasized that Congress enacted this bar to prevent state sponsors of terrorism from using procedural doctrines to delay justice for victims.

Sudan's appeal is dismissed without prejudice. The Republic must wait until the district court enters a final judgment on the merits of the case before it can appeal the immunity rulings. This decision reinforces the legislative intent to prevent state sponsors of terrorism from delaying litigation through interlocutory appeals, ensuring that victims can proceed to trial without procedural interruptions based on immunity denials under non-§ 1605A exceptions.

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