John Doe, an individual with a serious mental illness, sued New York State officials alleging that state regulations discriminated against him by blocking his readmission to Oceanview Manor Home for Adults, a Transitional Adult Home (TAH) where he previously lived. The regulations were designed to integrate facilities but initially prohibited TAHs from accepting new residents with serious mental illness until they met specific integration quotas. Doe filed suit in 2016 after being denied readmission. While the litigation was pending, the state took three key actions: it granted Doe a temporary restraining order allowing his return in 2017, it promulgated a 'Waiver Rule' in 2020 allowing case-by-case readmissions for former residents, and it removed Oceanview's classification as a TAH in 2024. The district court denied the state's motion for summary judgment on standing grounds, but the state appealed, arguing the case was moot.
The Second Circuit, writing for a unanimous panel, began by clarifying the legal framework. The court explained that Article III standing is determined as of the commencement of the suit. Because Doe faced a concrete injury when he filed his complaint, he possessed standing at that time. However, the court noted that events occurring after filing do not affect standing; instead, they are analyzed under the doctrine of mootness. Mootness asks whether a live controversy remains throughout the litigation. The court found that the state's voluntary cessation of the alleged illegal conduct—allowing Doe to return, changing the regulations, and removing Oceanview's restrictive classification—completely eradicated the effects of the alleged violation. The court applied the standard that a case is moot if there is no reasonable expectation that the violation will recur and interim events have irrevocably eliminated the harm. The court rejected Doe's argument that the state's discretion to deny future waivers created a continuing injury, noting that Doe had no concrete plan to leave Oceanview and that the facility was no longer subject to the regulations. Furthermore, the court held that the 'capable of repetition, yet evading review' exception did not apply. This exception requires that the challenged action be too short to be fully litigated and that there be a reasonable expectation the same party would be subjected to the same action again. The court found neither condition met, as the regulations had no expiration date and there was no probable risk that Doe would be excluded from Oceanview again given the facility's changed status.
The Second Circuit dismissed the appeal, vacated the district court's order denying summary judgment, and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This decision clarifies that while a plaintiff may have standing at the start of a lawsuit, a defendant's voluntary compliance or regulatory changes that eliminate the injury can render the case moot. It also reinforces that the 'capable of repetition' exception is reserved for exceptional situations where the plaintiff faces a high probability of recurring harm, not mere theoretical possibilities.