2nd Cir.

CARRÉ SUTTON v. TRUDI TAPSCOTT GÉRALD MARIE

November 4, 2024 ·22-2327 ·Panel Decision ·Richard J. Sullivan · By Aisha Johnson

The Second Circuit reversed the dismissal of a Child Victims Act claim, clarifying that New York law revives claims for out-of-state abuse if the victim was a New York resident when the cause of action accrued. The court also vacated a dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, ruling that the district court erred by raising the defense sua sponte without providing the plaintiff notice or an opportunity to plead facts.

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Carré Sutton filed suit against Trudi Tapscott and Gérald Marie, alleging that in 1986, while working as a child model in New York City, Tapscott sent her to Paris to live with Marie, who allegedly raped her. Sutton brought her claims under New York's Child Victims Act, which temporarily revived time-barred claims for sexual abuse of minors. The district court dismissed the claims against both defendants, ruling that the Act did not apply because the abuse occurred outside New York. Additionally, the court dismissed the claims against Marie for lack of personal jurisdiction, raising the issue on its own without notifying Sutton. Sutton appealed, arguing that the Act covers out-of-state abuse of New York residents and that the district court violated her due process rights by dismissing the jurisdictional defense sua sponte.

The Second Circuit addressed two primary issues. First, regarding the Child Victims Act, the court held that the district court misinterpreted the statute. While the Act revives claims based on conduct that would constitute a sexual offense under New York criminal law, subsequent New York intermediate court decisions clarified that territorial limitations in criminal statutes do not exclude civil claims under the Act. The consensus among New York courts is that the Act applies to out-of-state abuse if the plaintiff was a New York resident when the cause of action accrued. The court found Sutton plausibly alleged she was a New York resident at the time of the abuse, having moved there for her career and intending to return. Second, the court addressed the personal jurisdiction dismissal against Marie. The court reiterated that a plaintiff need not plead facts establishing personal jurisdiction in their complaint; it is an affirmative defense the defendant must raise. While courts may raise jurisdiction sua sponte in limited circumstances involving non-appearing defendants, they must provide the plaintiff notice and an opportunity to establish jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the claims against Marie without providing Sutton this opportunity, violating the long-standing rule that a court may not dismiss an action without notice and an opportunity to be heard.

The case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings. On remand, the statute of limitations defense is removed, allowing Sutton's Child Victims Act claims to proceed. Regarding the claims against Marie, the district court must provide Sutton notice and an opportunity to plead facts establishing personal jurisdiction before considering dismissal. If Marie continues to decline to appear and the court anticipates a default judgment, it must order Sutton to show cause why her claims should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

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