9th Cir.

FRANK V. TESLA, INC., ET AL.

May 1, 2026 ·2:22-cv-01590-MEMF-AGR ·Unpublished · By Aisha Johnson

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order compelling arbitration and denying the motion to vacate, holding that the employment agreement was not unconscionable under California law. The court found that while unequal bargaining power created some procedural unfairness, the agreement lacked sufficient substantive unfairness because the district court had already severed the offending carve-out provision.

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Naymon Frank, an individual, sued Tesla, Inc. and his former supervisor, Suzie Hatzis, in state court in January 2022, alleging fourteen claims including discrimination, harassment, fraud, and violations of California labor laws. These claims arose from Frank's employment at Tesla, which began in 2016 and ended in 2020. At the time of hiring, Frank signed an employment contract containing an agreement to arbitrate future disputes. Tesla moved to compel arbitration, and the district court granted the motion, compelling Frank to arbitrate his claims. Following the arbitration proceedings, an arbitrator issued a final award. Frank then moved to vacate the award, arguing the arbitrator committed misconduct and exceeded her powers. The district court denied the motion to vacate. Frank appealed both the order compelling arbitration and the order denying the motion to vacate to the Ninth Circuit.

The Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision to compel arbitration de novo. Under California law, a contract is unconscionable only if both procedural and substantive unconscionability are present. The court acknowledged that the unequal bargaining power between Tesla and Frank created a degree of procedural unconscionability. However, the court applied a sliding-scale test, noting that a greater degree of procedural unconscionability is tolerated if there is a lesser degree of substantive unfairness. The court found the agreement lacked sufficient substantive unfairness. Frank argued that a carve-out provision allowing certain disputes to be adjudicated in court was unconscionable, but the district court had already declined to enforce that specific provision, concluding it was substantively unconscionable. Frank also argued that the agreement imposed impermissible limitations on discovery, but the court noted the agreement empowered the arbitrator to compel adequate discovery and did not dispute that the arbitrator's plan permitted necessary discovery. Additionally, Frank conceded below that he did not argue any JAMS rules were unconscionable. Regarding the motion to vacate, the court applied a high standard, requiring a showing that the arbitrator committed more than a serious error or that the award was completely irrational. Frank argued the arbitrator limited discovery, but the court found the rulings did not deprive him of a fundamentally fair hearing. Frank also argued the arbitrator exceeded her powers, but the court held that disagreement with the merits of discovery rulings or summary judgment decisions does not meet the high bar for vacatur.

The arbitration award stands as final and binding, precluding Frank from litigating his discrimination and labor law claims in court. The decision reinforces the enforceability of arbitration agreements in employment contracts where substantive unfairness has been cured by severing unconscionable clauses. It also clarifies that challenges to an arbitrator's discovery rulings or summary judgment decisions generally do not meet the high standard required to vacate an award under the Federal Arbitration Act.

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