Santos Naul Mass-Soto was convicted by a jury of reentry of a removed alien in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 and sentenced to 27 months of imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. On appeal, Mass argued that the district court committed plain error by failing to order a competency examination on its own initiative and that he was improperly removed from the courtroom during his trial. The appeal arose from a case where Mass had been detained as a material witness in a prior criminal case and claimed he was promised a U visa, a claim his attorneys told him lacked factual or legal support.
The panel reviewed the competency claim for plain error, applying the standard that a defendant is incompetent if they lack the capacity to understand the proceedings or assist in their defense. The court reasoned that the district court was not faced with evidence of incompetence sufficient to trigger a duty to act sua sponte. First, there was no medical evidence suggesting Mass had a mental disease or defect; the record showed he had never been under the care of mental health professionals. Second, while Mass's attorneys did not affirmatively state he was competent, none moved for a hearing, and the court noted that counsel is in the best position to evaluate a client's comprehension. The court interpreted Mass's strained relationships with counsel and his insistence on a U visa theory as evidence of frustration and desperation rather than an inability to understand the proceedings. The court observed that Mass's belief in the U visa promise was not inherently implausible given his prior detention as a material witness. Furthermore, Mass demonstrated he could comprehend aspects of the trial, with the district court noting it had the impression that Mass understood the rulings but disagreed with them. His behavior was not sufficiently bizarre or erratic to raise genuine doubt about his competency. Regarding the right to be present, the court held that this right is not absolute. Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43 and precedent, a defendant may lose this right if they continue to act in a disorderly manner after being warned. Mass spoke out of turn loudly on three occasions. After two warnings, including a final warning, the district court removed him after the third interruption. The court found this action consistent with Supreme Court precedent allowing a trial to proceed in a defendant's absence if they are unwilling to conduct themselves with the decorum inherent in judicial proceedings.
The decision affirms the conviction and sentence, closing the door on claims that the district court should have ordered a competency exam based on the specific facts presented. It reinforces the principle that a defendant's insistence on a specific legal theory, even if factually incorrect, does not automatically signal incompetence. Additionally, the ruling clarifies that trial courts have broad discretion to remove disruptive defendants after warnings, and they are not required to arrange alternative listening methods before proceeding in the defendant's absence.
Podcast (federal-narrative-summaries): Play in new window | Download