Koby Don Williams, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officer, was charged with attempting to entice a minor to engage in sexual activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). The government alleged that between July 23 and July 26, 2022, Williams engaged in nearly 100 text messages and phone calls with an undercover decoy named 'Rebecca,' who repeatedly stated she was thirteen years old. Williams, posing as 'Troy,' negotiated a price for sex, offered to pay for a trip to Montana, and eventually traveled to a hotel in Othello, Washington, with cash and condoms to meet the decoy. After his arrest, Williams claimed he was conducting a human trafficking investigation. At trial, he testified that he never believed Rebecca was a minor and that he was seeking an adult sex worker. The jury convicted him, and the district court applied a two-level sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice based on his alleged perjury, adopting the presentence investigation report without making independent findings on the falsity of his testimony.
The panel addressed three primary issues. First, regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, the court rejected Williams's argument that Section 2422(b) requires the government to prove he attempted to 'transform or overcome the will of a minor.' The court clarified that the statute's verbs—persuade, induce, entice, and coerce—do not require the victim to be unwilling or for the defendant to change the victim's will; rather, they target the defendant's intent to influence the minor. The court found that a rational trier of fact could conclude Williams knowingly attempted to entice a minor by negotiating payment, making sexual advances, and traveling to meet her, even if he subjectively doubted her age. The court noted that Williams's own testimony regarding his disbelief was a credibility issue for the jury to resolve, and the evidence of his conduct was compelling. Second, the court addressed a new Brady claim regarding a 'missing published decoy advertisement.' Reviewing for plain error, the court found no viable claim because Williams could not show materiality; he testified he never saw the specific post in question, and the post itself would not have been exculpatory given his continued efforts to meet the minor despite being told she was thirteen. Third, the court addressed the sentencing enhancement. Citing United States v. Dunnigan, the court held that when a defendant objects to an obstruction enhancement based on trial testimony, the district court must make independent findings that the testimony was false, material, and willful. The government agreed that the district court failed to make these explicit findings. Consequently, the court could not uphold the enhancement.
The conviction for attempted online enticement stands, reinforcing that a defendant's subjective disbelief of a minor's age does not negate the elements of the crime if their conduct objectively constitutes an attempt to entice. However, the sentence is vacated, and the case is remanded for resentencing. On remand, the district court must either make the specific factual findings required to support the obstruction of justice enhancement or impose a new sentence without that enhancement. This decision clarifies that the 'transform or overcome' language from other circuits does not alter the plain meaning of the statute in the Ninth Circuit and emphasizes the strict procedural requirements for applying obstruction enhancements based on trial testimony.
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