9th Cir.

LINDSEY NIKOLA v. PETER FOLEY and UNITED STATES SKI & SNOWBOARD

LINDSEY NIKOLA v. PETER FOLEY and UNITED STATES SKI & SNOWBOARD

March 19, 2026 ·2:23-cv-00811-SPG-JPR ·Unpublished · By Maria Santos

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of general jurisdiction claims but reversed its dismissal of specific jurisdiction over certain tort claims against USA Ski & Snowboard and Peter Foley. The court held that California courts may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over the defendants regarding sexual harassment and negligence claims arising from training camps held in the state.

Plaintiffs Lindsey Nikola, Rosey Fletcher, Erin O'Malley, and Callan Chythlook-Sifsof sued Peter Foley, the United States Ski and Snowboard Association, and the United States Olympic and Paralympic Committee in the Central District of California. The plaintiffs alleged violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, as well as various state-law claims including sexual harassment, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). The district court granted the motion, ruling that it lacked both general and specific jurisdiction over the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed, challenging the district court's conclusion that the defendants' contacts with California were insufficient to support the exercise of judicial power.

The Ninth Circuit analyzed the jurisdictional claims by separating general and specific jurisdiction. For general jurisdiction, the court applied the standard from Daimler AG v. Bauman, which limits general jurisdiction to a defendant's place of incorporation or principal place of business, or an exceptional case where the defendant is essentially at home in the forum. The court found the defendants' headquarters were in Oregon, Utah, and Colorado, and their activities in California—coaching and holding competitions—were not 'so substantial and of such a nature as to render them at home.' Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal of general jurisdiction. Regarding specific jurisdiction, the court applied a three-part test: purposeful availment, a nexus between the forum contacts and the claim, and reasonableness. For contract claims, the court affirmed the dismissal, noting that the mere existence of a contract or breach occurring during California events was insufficient without affirmative conduct like negotiations or performance within the state. However, for tort claims, the court reversed. Applying the Calder effects test, the court found that the defendants purposefully directed activities toward California by organizing training camps and events there. The plaintiffs alleged that Foley groomed them during these California-based activities and that the organizations facilitated access to the athletes. The court determined a direct nexus existed because, but for the California events, the alleged harms would not have occurred. Finally, the court found the exercise of jurisdiction reasonable, citing California's interest in protecting its residents from sexual abuse and the inconvenience to defendants of litigating in multiple jurisdictions if California were not a proper forum. The court also noted that the district court could exercise pendent personal jurisdiction over remaining claims arising from the same common nucleus of operative facts.

The decision allows the plaintiffs' tort claims regarding sexual harassment, negligence, and emotional distress to proceed in California federal court, while the RICO and contract claims remain subject to further jurisdictional analysis or dismissal. On remand, the district court must determine if it can exercise pendent personal jurisdiction over the remaining claims, such as sexual assault and battery, based on their connection to the tort claims that survived. This ruling clarifies that organizing sports events in a state can create specific jurisdiction for torts committed during those events, even if the defendants are not headquartered there.