Marco Bracamonte-Palma, a native and citizen of Mexico, sought cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C). This form of relief is statutorily unavailable to any non-citizen who has been convicted of a domestic violence offense, which includes violating a protection order under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii). An Immigration Judge denied his application, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed that denial. The BIA relied on a police report and Arizona court minutes showing that Bracamonte-Palma pled guilty to violating a protection order entered for the safety of his wife, the victim of the violation. Bracamonte-Palma petitioned the Ninth Circuit for review, challenging the BIA's reliance on the police report and the legal standard applied to his conviction.
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo on legal questions and affirmed the BIA's decision. The court first addressed the legal standard for determining whether a violation of a protection order triggers the ineligibility bar. Relying on its precedent in Diaz-Quirazco v. Barr, the court held that the categorical approach does not apply to this specific statutory provision. Instead, the inquiry focuses on whether the non-citizen actually violated the order. The court noted that while the Supreme Court's decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo eliminated Chevron deference, the Ninth Circuit remains bound by its prior precedent that relied on the Chevron framework when the agency has not promulgated a new interpretation. Consequently, the court applied the Diaz-Quirazco standard. On the factual issue, the court rejected Bracamonte-Palma's argument that the police report was insufficient. Citing Nijhawan v. Holder and Haile v. Holder, the court explained that the sole test for evidence is whether it is probative and its admission is fundamentally fair. The court found that the police report, combined with Arizona court minutes confirming the guilty plea and the plea agreement's reference to the specific police report number, provided substantial evidence that Bracamonte-Palma violated the no-contact portion of the order. The court concluded that the BIA fully considered the necessary steps and that its decision could be sustained upon its reasoning.
The petitioner remains subject to removal proceedings as the BIA's finding of ineligibility stands. The decision reinforces the Ninth Circuit's stance that police reports are sufficient evidence to prove violations of protection orders for immigration purposes and clarifies that the categorical approach is inapplicable to this specific statutory bar. No remand instructions were issued as the petition was simply denied.
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