Miguel Angel Uribe Andrade, a native of Mexico, entered the United States as a child and later faced removal proceedings due to multiple criminal convictions, including drug offenses. He applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), arguing that he would face persecution or torture if returned to Mexico. His asylum claims relied on a proposed particular social group defined as 'Mexicans with mental health disorders characterized by psychotic features who exhibit erratic behavior.' He feared that without access to specific mental health treatment in Mexico, he would be involuntarily committed to facilities with abusive conditions. Additionally, he claimed he would be tortured by cartels or officials due to his past gang affiliation and tattoos. The Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied his claims, finding the proposed social group insufficiently particular and the CAT claims unsupported by substantial evidence.
The panel first addressed jurisdiction, noting that while 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) generally bars review of removal orders against aliens removable for criminal offenses, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) preserves jurisdiction to review questions of law. The court determined that the cognizability of a particular social group is a question of law, allowing the petition to proceed. Regarding the asylum claim, the court applied the three-part test for particular social groups: common immutable characteristic, particularity, and social distinctness. The court focused on particularity, which requires a group to be discrete and have definable boundaries. The BIA found the group lacked particularity because the phrase 'erratic behavior' was not defined in the record, clinically or otherwise, and was not used by Uribe's treatment providers. The Ninth Circuit agreed, explaining that nothing inherent in the phrase required the BIA to treat it as self-defining. Unlike the precedent in Acevedo Granados v. Garland, where a clinical diagnosis of 'intellectual disability' was ignored in favor of a lay judgment, here there was no clinical evidence defining 'erratic behavior' to begin with. The court distinguished the Fourth Circuit's decision in Temu v. Holder, noting that Temu involved a specific clinical diagnosis of bipolar disorder and cultural context not present here. Consequently, the BIA did not err in concluding the group was amorphous. On the CAT claim, the court applied the 'substantial evidence' standard. Uribe's first theory—that he would be tortured in a mental health facility—failed because the record did not compel the conclusion that he would be unable to obtain medication or be involuntarily committed. Even if committed, the court found the poor conditions in Mexican facilities resulted from budget constraints rather than the specific intent to inflict torture required by the CAT. His second theory regarding gang-related torture failed because he presented no evidence of a particularized threat or government acquiescence.
The decision affirms the BIA's denial of relief, leaving Uribe subject to removal. It reinforces the requirement that proposed social groups involving mental health terms must be supported by clear, record-based clinical definitions to satisfy the particularity requirement. The ruling clarifies that general evidence of poor conditions in foreign mental health facilities is insufficient for CAT relief without proof of specific intent to torture by government officials.
Podcast (federal-narrative-summaries): Play in new window | Download