9th Cir.

Doerr v. Shinn

May 4, 2026 ·20-99002 ·Published ·William A. Fletcher · By Aisha Johnson

The Ninth Circuit granted a stay and abeyance to allow a death row inmate to present an ineffective assistance of counsel claim at sentencing to state court. The court held that it is unclear whether Arizona procedural rules bar such a claim in a second post-conviction petition.

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Background

Eugene Doerr was sentenced to death in Arizona for the murder of Karen Bohl. He filed a federal habeas petition claiming ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing and an Atkins claim regarding intellectual disability. The district court denied relief, finding the claims procedurally defaulted. While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Shinn v. Ramirez, limiting federal courts’ ability to consider evidence not presented to state courts. Doerr moved for a stay and abeyance under Rhines v. Weber to return to state court and file a second post-conviction petition to present the evidence supporting his ineffective assistance claim.

The court’s reasoning

The panel held that the criteria for a Rhines stay are applicable to Doerr’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The court found that Doerr’s failure to present the claim in his first petition was due to the ignorance or inadvertence of his first post-conviction counsel. The claim is potentially meritorious, and Doerr has not engaged in intentionally dilatory tactics. Regarding the procedural bar, the court noted that recent Arizona Supreme Court decisions, including State v. Traverso, indicate that it is not clear whether Arizona courts would hold the claim precluded under Rule 32.2(a)(3). Principles of comity and federalism counsel against the federal court substituting its judgment for that of the state courts when the outcome is unclear. The court corrected its prior opinion, concluding that the request for a Rhines stay regarding the Atkins claim should be addressed by the district court in the first instance.

Principles of comity and federalism counsel against substituting our judgment for that of the state courts.

Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004)

The dissent

I disagree because, as explained in State v. Traverso, the narrow textual exception to Arizona’s procedural-default rule for an IAC claim implicating a right of sufficient constitutional magnitude does not apply here.

Danielle J. Forrest

What it means going forward

The case is remanded to the district court with instructions to stay and abey the federal habeas petition, allowing Doerr to return to state court to present his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a second post-conviction petition.

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