Background
Eugene Doerr was sentenced to death for murder. His first postconviction counsel failed to investigate or present an ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding the sentencing phase. After federal habeas proceedings, the Ninth Circuit granted a stay and abeyance under Rhines v. Weber to allow Doerr to file a second state petition. The Arizona Supreme Court subsequently decided State v. Traverso, which the panel considered in an amended opinion.
The court’s reasoning
The panel held that the Rhines criteria were met because Doerr’s failure to present the claim was due to his counsel’s ignorance or inadvertence, the claim was potentially meritorious, and he was not intentionally dilatory. The court found it was not clear that Arizona courts would deem the claim procedurally barred under Rule thirty-two point two, subsection a, paragraph three, citing State v. Traverso, State v. Diaz, and State v. Anderson. The court concluded that principles of comity and federalism counseled against substituting its judgment for that of the state courts on the procedural question. The panel corrected its prior opinion to exclude the Atkins claim from the stay.
Applying Stewart’s automatic preclusion for successive IAC claims in conjunction with Rule 32.2(a)(3) would require this Court to ignore the plain text of the only exception provided by the Rule. We decline to do so.
State v. Traverso, 576 P.3d 97, 104 (Ariz. 2025)
The dissent
I disagree because, as explained in State v. Traverso, the narrow textual exception to Arizona’s procedural-default rule for an IAC claim implicating a right of sufficient constitutional magnitude does not apply here.
Danielle J. Forrest
What it means going forward
The case is remanded to the district court with instructions to stay and abey the federal habeas petition, allowing Doerr to present his sentencing-phase ineffective assistance claim to the Arizona courts in a second postconviction petition.
Podcast (federal-narrative-summaries): Play in new window | Download