Jalen Craig McMillan was convicted by a federal jury of conspiracy to commit bank fraud, three counts of bank fraud, and aggravated identity theft. The underlying scheme involved McMillan and coconspirators using stolen identities to open accounts at the credit union where McMillan worked. These accounts were used to obtain loans and funds, which were then withdrawn in cash and distributed among the group. The district court sentenced McMillan to 54 months in prison, five years of supervised release, and ordered him to pay over $165,000 in restitution. On appeal, McMillan argued that the district court erred by allowing testimony from a non-expert government witness and by denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal.
The Fourth Circuit reviewed the case under abuse of discretion for preserved evidentiary challenges and plain error for unpreserved ones. First, regarding the testimony of Joseph Kropff, an investigative financial analyst, McMillan argued he was improperly allowed to give expert testimony without being designated as an expert. The court clarified the distinction between Federal Rule of Evidence 701 (lay opinion) and 702 (expert opinion). The court found that Kropff's testimony on how he developed McMillan as a suspect was based on his personal perception of the evidence and called for 'common sense' rather than specialized knowledge. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony. Second, McMillan challenged the admission of testimony from coconspirator Jovan Bell, citing Hammer v. United States, which he argued required corroboration for accomplice testimony. The court rejected this, noting that the Fourth Circuit has long held that uncorroborated accomplice testimony is sufficient to sustain a conviction. The court also clarified that the holding in Hammer applies only to perjury cases, not bank fraud. Finally, the court reviewed the denial of McMillan's Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal de novo. The court found substantial evidence supporting the conviction, including text messages sent from McMillan's phone, employee time sheets placing him at the credit union during fraudulent transactions, and credit union records linking his employee ID to the fraudulent accounts. While McMillan only specifically challenged the sufficiency of evidence regarding who sent the text messages, the court found that any other challenges were forfeited and that no manifest miscarriage of justice occurred given the totality of the evidence.
The decision affirms the district court's judgment, meaning McMillan's conviction and sentence stand. The ruling reinforces the Fourth Circuit's standard that lay witnesses may testify to conclusions drawn from their investigation if those conclusions rely on common sense rather than specialized expertise. It also confirms that uncorroborated accomplice testimony is legally sufficient for conviction in this circuit and that defendants must specifically raise sufficiency challenges in their Rule 29 motions to preserve them for appeal.